Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 2

Article 2

1-1-1978

Antitrust in the European Economic Community:
An Analysis of Recent Developments in the Court
of Justice
Jonathan S. Wolfe
Richard Montauk

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jonathan S. Wolfe and Richard Montauk, Antitrust in the European Economic Community: An Analysis of Recent Developments in the
Court of Justice, 18 Santa Clara L. Rev. 349 (1978).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

ANTITRUST IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE
Jonathan S. Wolfe* and Richard Montauk**
INTRODUCTION

In this third decade of the European Economic Community (EEC),' it is more important than ever that its significance be taken to heart by Americans. The EEC is the single
largest trading entity in the world, in addition to being the
official commercial representative of nations to which many
Americans have special ancestral and cultural ties. As a bold
experiment in federalism, it stands as the most interesting of
current attempts to combine states of widely differing backgrounds into one economic, and possibly governmental unit.
Thus, the EEC is a project of scope at least comparable to that
of the founding of the United States.'
The United States has an intellectual interest in comparing this experiment in federalism with its own, a humanitarian
interest in seeing that the experiment succeeds for the benefit
of nations long friendly to the United States, and an economic
interest in understanding the laws of the Common Market
which can impact on United States-European trade. It is to the
last of these interests that this article is directed. In particular,
the article focuses on recent developments in the field of antitrust law as set forth in European Court of Justice3 decisions,
because it is this field that most directly affects American
trade. While antitrust law is of interest to economists who are
concerned with the distributive justice or economic efficiency
* A.B., 1972, Stanford University; J.D., 1976, Harvard Law School; LL.B., 1976,
Cambridge University; Member, State Bar of California.
** A.B., 1975, Brown University; Second year law student, Stanford University.

1. W.

ALEXANDER, THE

EEC

RULES OF CoMPETrrION 1

(1973).

2. Its formation, however, was based not upon the need to protect itself from the
outside world, but upon the notion that it behooves Western Europeans to act in
concert in such a way as to avert any possibility of future internecine struggle, and to
reap economic and cultural benefits from free exchange between nations. To this
extent it may be said to be an outgrowth of post-World War II sentiments. Id.
3. The European Court of Justice is one of the three institutions which govern
the EEC Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 4, 298 U.N.T.S. 16. The legislative
body is the Council of Ministers, id. arts. 145-154, 298 U.N.T.S. at 69-71, and the
executive organization is the Commission of the European Communities. Id. art. 155,
298 U.N.T.S. at 71.
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resulting from the operation of a given set of rules, the emphasis here will be upon the interpretation and development of the
legal rules themselves by the Court of Justice.
The rules discussed are those contained in Articles 85
through 90 of the Treaty of Rome, 4 as construed by the European Court of Justice. Articles 85, 86, and 90 contain much of
the substantive law in the antitrust field, but they provide only
broad guidelines. Judicial interpretation is necessary to insure
that these sweeping rules and the somewhat detailed supplementary regulations, fulfill their intended purpose in the context of a specific case. Court of Justice rulings thus provide
practical standards for implementing the policies that are set
forth in the Treaty of Rome. This article is concerned with the
development of some of the more important of these standards
in recent Court of Justice decisions, and with recent interpretations by the Court of the procedural rules through which they
are given effect.
THE COMPETITION PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF ROME: A BASIC
OVERVIEW

To begin, an overview of the operation of the basic treaty
provisions is necessary. Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome' provides that the activities of the EEC shall include "the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be
distorted in the Common Market." Articles 85 through 94 of
the Treaty set out the framework of this competition policy.
Article 856 on restrictive trade practices and Article 861 on
abuse of dominant position are the cornerstones of the system.
All restrictive trade agreements between "undertakings"
(business enterprises) which affect trade between member
states are prohibited by Article 85(1). Such an agreement is
automatically void pursuant to Article 85(2). Article 85(3) provides for exemptions from 85(1) under certain circumstances.
Additionally, Council Regulation 17 contains rules for prohibiting and exempting agreements. 8 This Regulation also contains
a procedure known as negative clearance pursuant to which the
4. Id. arts. 85-90, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-50. For a general treatment of antitrust law
in the EEC, see Comment, A Survey of Antitrust Law in the European Economic
Community, 16 SA'wA CLARA L. REV. 535 (1976).
5. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 3(f), 298 U.N.T.S. 16.
6. Id. art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47.
7. Id. art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. at 48-49.
8. Council Regulation 17, art. 9, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2401 (1962).
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Commission of the European Communities (Commission) can
declare that agreements or classes of agreements do not fall
under Article 85(1) at all.
Article 86 prohibits any abuse of a dominant position held
in a particular market if it affects trade between member
states.
Both Articles 85 and 86 are implemented by the provisions
contained in Articles 87 through 89. These sections also define
the responsibility of Community and national authorities. Finally, special rules for public undertakings and undertakings
"to which [member states] grant special or exclusive rights"
are contained in Article 90.10 Transitional rules on dumping are
provided in Article 91," and provisions regarding state aid to
the national economy are in Articles 92 through 94.1
ARTICLE

85:

RESTRICTIVE TRADE AGREEMENTS

Article 85(1)'" prohibits "all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market ...
Thus, four requirements must be met for the prohibition
to be applicable:
1. There must be either an agreement,' 4 a decision
6
of an association,15 or a concerted practice.'
9. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, arts. 87-89, 298 U.N.T.S. 49-50.
10. Id. art. 90, 298 U.N.T.S. at 50.
11. Id. art. 91.
12. Id. arts. 92-94, 298 U.N.T.S. at 51-52.
13. Id. art. 85(1), 298 U.N.T.S. at 47 (translation from 1 COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 2005 (1973)).
14. The Treaty does not define the term "agreements." Probably "gentlemen's
agreements" fall under Article 85(1), see International Quinine Cartel, Commission
Decision of July 16, 1969, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 192) 5 (1969), [1965-1969 Trans9313, as do oral agreefer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
ments, see Omega, Commission Decision of Oct. 28, 1970, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
242) 22 (1970), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP.
9396 [hereinafter cited as Omega]. Article 85(1) applies to both horizontal
(CCH)
and vertical agreements. Italy v. EEC Council & Comm'n, [1961-1966 Court Deci8048 (Ct. J. 1966); Socit Technique Mini~re v.
sions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, [1961-1966 Court Decisions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8047 (Ct. J. 1966)[hereinafter cited as Technique Mini~re].
15. Many of the Commission's decisions have dealt with the decisions, the articles of membership, or the statutes of trade associations. See, e.g., German Ceramic
Tiles, Commission Decision of Dec. 29, 1970, [Jan., 1971] J.O. COMM. Eua. (No. L
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2. There must be more than one undertaking involved."

3. The practice, agreement or decision must be one
which may have an effect on trade between member
states.' 8
4. The object or effect of the agreement, decision or
practice must be to prevent, distort, or restrict competition within the Common Market.'"
Pursuant to Article 85(2), agreements falling under the
prohibition of Article 85(1) are automatically void.
Article 85(3) provides for exemption from the prohibition
of Article 85(1) in certain cases. Only the Commission" can
grant such an exemption, although its decision can be appealed
10) 15, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T
9409 (aggregated rebates taken at general meeting of Ass'n of German Ceramic Tiles
Producers); A.S.P.A., Commission Decision of June 30, 1970, 13 J.O. COMM. EUa. (No.
L 148) 9 (1970), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9379.
16. Concerted practices are the co-ordinated actions of undertakings resulting
from informal cooperation rather than formal agreement. See, e.g., Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd. v. EEC Comm'n, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8161 (Ct. J. 1972) [hereinafter cited as ICI].
17. The term "undertaking" which is not defined in the Treaty should be interpreted broadly to encompass all entities which conduct business including sole proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, etc. Public and state enterprises are also undertakings as indicated by Article 90. See text accompanying notes 52-54 infra, in regard
to the enterprise-entity doctrine.
18. In Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Comm'n, [1961-1966 Court
Decisions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8046, at 7652 (Ct. J. 1966) [hereinafter cited
as Consten & Grundig], the Court said:
In this connection, it is especially important to know whether the agreement directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, is capable of jeopardizing the freedom of the trade between Member States in such a manner
as to prejudice the realization of the objectives of a single market between
States. Thus, the fact that an agreement helps to bring about a considerable increase in volume of trade between Member States is not sufficient
to preclude the possibility that such agreement can "affect" trade within
the meaning stated above.
In determining whether an agreement falls within the above definition, its legal and
economic context must be taken into consideration. Id.; Technique Mini~re, supra
note 14.
19. An agreement must have either the object or the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. In determining whether this condition has been satisfied,
account should be taken of the economic context of the agreement. Volk v. Vervaecke,
[1967-1970 Court Decisions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8074 (Ct. J. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Volk]; Technique Mini~re, supra note 14.
20. The Commission, the chief executive body of the Community, is charged
with administering the competition rules of the Treaty. Treaty of Rome, done March
25, 1957, art. 155, 298 U.N.T.S. 71; see note 3 supra.
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to the European Court of Justice. 2 In order to obtain an Article
85(3) exemption, the following four conditions must be satisfied:
1. The
tribute:
a.
goods,"
b.
goods, 3
c.
d.

agreement, decision, or practice must conto the improvement of the production of
to the improvement of the distribution of
24
to the promotion of technical progress, or
25
to the promotion of economic progress.

2. Consumers must be allowed a fair share of the
resulting benefit."
21. Council Regulation 17, art. 9, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2481 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Lightweight Paper, Commission Decision of July 26, 1972, [Aug.,
1972] J.O. COMM. Eun. (No. L. 182) 24, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Develop9523 [hereinafter cited as Lightweight Paper]
ments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
(research and development agreement); MAN-SAVIEM, Commission Decision of Jan.
17, 1972, [Feb., 1972] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 31) 29, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder,
9494 [hereinafter cited as MANNew Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
SAVIEM] (speculation agreement).
23. See, e.g., CEMATEX, Commission Decision of Sept. 24, 1971, [Oct., 1971]
J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 227) 26, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments]
9460 [hereinafter cited as CEMATEX]; CECIMO, ComCOMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
mission Decision of March 13, 1969, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 69) 13 (1969), [19681975 Restrictive Practices Supp.] COMM. MKT. L.R. Dl [hereinafter cited as CECIMO] (agreement rationalizing trade fairs); Omega, supra note 14 (selective distribution agreement outside of Regulation 67); Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n. Commission Decision of June 27, 1967, [July, 1967] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 163) 10, [19651969 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9188 (agreement between small and medium-sized paint producers).
24. See Davidson Rubber Co., Commission Decision of June 9, 1972, [June,
1972] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 143) 31, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Develop9512 [hereinafter cited as Davidson Rubber]
ments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
(patent licensing agreements); FN-CF, Commission Decision of May 28, 1971, [June,
1971] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 134) 6, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Develop9439 [hereinafter cited as FN-CF]; MANments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
SAVIEM, supra note 22; Henkel-Colgate, Commission Decision of Dec. 23, 1971,
[Jan., 1972] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 14) 14, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Devel9491 [hereinafter cited as Henkel-Colgate];
opments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
ACEC-Berliet, Commission Decision of July 17, 1968, [Aug., 1968] J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. L 201) 7, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9251 [hereinafter cited as ACEC-Berliet] (research agreements).
25. See, e.g., Davidson Rubber, supra note 24; CECIMO, supra note 23; ClimaChap6e, Commission Decision of July 22, 1969, [Aug., 1969] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
195) 1, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9316 [hereinafter cited as Clima-Chap~e] (special agreement).
26. See, e.g., Lightweight Paper, supra note 22; Henkel-Colgate, supra note 24;
FN-CF, supra note 24.
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3. The restriction imposed on the parties must be
absolutely necessary for the attainment of the objectives
in 1 and 2.27

4. The parties must not have the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the
products in question."8
Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights
Article 222 of the Treaty of Rome provides that "[tihis
treaty shall in no way prejudice the system existing in Member
States in respect of property." 9 However, in several cases, national schemes for intellectual property have been utilized to
prevent the free movement of goods between member states.3
The Court of Justice has responded by holding that although the existence of national intellectual property rights, as
such, is not affected by the Treaty, the exercise of these rights
in a way that prevents free trade between member states is
prohibited by several Treaty provisions,"' including Articles 30
through 36,32 dealing with the free movement of goods, as well
33
as Articles 85 and 86.
Consten & Grundig v. EEC Commission"4 is perhaps the
leading case demonstrating the Court's application of Article
85 to intellectual property rights. In that case, Consten, Grundig's exclusive distributor in France was empowered to register
the GINT trademark in France, such registration to be cancelled or transferred if Consten and Grundig ceased association. The Commission issued a decision requiring Consten not
27. See, e.g., CEMATEX, supra note 23; Omega, supra note 14; CECIMO, supra
note 23.
28. See, e.g., Lightweight Paper, supra note 22; Sopelem-Langen, Commission
Decision of Dec. 20, 1971, [Jan., 1972] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 13) 47, [1970-1972
Transfer Binder, New Developments COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9488 [hereinafter
cited as Sopelem-Langen]. Two cases contain detailed descriptions of the market in
question. See MAN-SAVIEM, supra note 22; FN-CF, supra note 24.
29. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 222, 298 U.N.T.S. 88.
30. See Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro, [1971-1973 Court Decisions]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8106 (Ct. J. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Deutsche Grammophon]; Sirena v. Eda, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101
(Ct. J. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Sirena]; Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, [1967-1970
Court Decisions], COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8054 (Ct. J. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Parke, Davis]; Consten & Grundig, supra note 18.
31. See, e.g., id.
32. See Deutsche Grammophon, supra note 30.
33. See Sirena, supra note 30; Parke, Davis, supra note 30; Consten & Grundig,
supra note 18.
34. Consten & Grundig, supra note 18.
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to exercise the trademark in a manner that would prevent parallel imports. The Court found that the Commission had acted
within its authority since this requirement affected only the
exercise, but not the existence, of the right, and that the agreement could violate Article 85(1) since it had the object of restricting competition." Therefore, 85(1) is applicable if intellectual property rights are exercised to prevent parallel imports
and if that exercise is "the object, the means or the consequence of an agreement.""6
Additionally, Article 86 may apply to intellectual property
rights if the relevant undertaking has a dominant position
within the Common Market or a substantial part of it, the
exercise of the right is an abuse of that position, and this abuse
is likely to affect trade between member states.37 A dominant
position appears to require more than the monopolistic position
which an intellectual property right confers.
From 1974 through 1977, the Court of Justice handed down
three noteworthy decisions dealing with intellectual property
rights: Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G.,"5 the Centrafarm
cases,39 and the EMI cases. 0 Although these three cases were
concerned with the rules relating to the free circulation of
goods, the Court in each case made certain findings in regard
to Article 85.
Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A. G. In 1907 and 1908, the German firm, Hag A.G., first holder of a patent for the decaffein35. The Court issued a consistent ruling in Sirena, supra note 30, in which it held
that the exercise of trademark rights can contribute to market insulation.
36. Sirena, supra note 30, at 7112.
37. See Deutsche Grammophon, supra note 30; Sirens, supra note 30; Parke,
Davis, supra note 30. It is also possible that neither Article 85(1) nor Article 86 will
apply to the mere exercise of an intellectual property right. Article 85(1) is not applicable if there is no relevant agreement, practice, or decision. Likewise, such exercise is
not necessarily an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 86. See Deutsche
Grammaphon, supra note 30; Parke, Davis, supra note 30.
8230 (Ct. J. 1974)
38. [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
[hereinafter cited as Hag].
39. Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug, Inc. [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
8246 (Ct. J. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Sterling]; Centrafarm B.V. v.
REP. (CCH)
Winthrop B.V., [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. RE. (CCH) 8247 (Ct. J. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Winthrop]. Hereinafter, the foregoing cases will be cited collectively as Centrafarm cases.
40. See EMI Records, Ltd. v. CBS Schallplatten GmbH, [1976 Transfer
8352 (Ct. J. 1976); EMI Records, Ltd. v. CBS
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8351 (Ct. J.
Grammophon A/S, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
1976); EMI Records, Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom, Ltd., [1976 Transfer Binder]
8350 (Ct. J. 1976) [preceding three cases hereinafter cited
COMM. MKT.REP. (CCH)
collectively as EMIl.
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ating of coffee, registered trademarks for its coffee containing
the word. "Hag" in Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In
1927, Hag A.G. created a Belgian subsidiary, Cafe Hag S.A.,
to which, in 1935, it transferred its Belgian and Luxembourg
trademarks. After World War II, the shares of Cafe Hag S.A.
were put under sequestration as enemy property. Eventually,
Belgium sold these shares to the Van Oevelen family.
In June, 1971, Cafe Hag S.A. transferred its trademark,
but not the rest of its business, to Van Zuylen Freres which
purchased decaffeinated coffee from Cafe Hag S.A. In 1972,
Hag A.G. began to supply its coffee to retailers in Luxembourg
under its German trademark, "Hag." Van Zuylen reacted by
bringing an action for trademark infringement before the Tribunal of Luxembourg in November, 1972. In April, 1973, Van
Zuylen brought a second action to cancel the trademark of
Hag A.G. in Belgium and Luxembourg.
The Tribunal of Luxembourg, by a judgment of October
31, 1973, requested the Court of Justice to give a preliminary
ruling on, inter alia, whether Article 85 prohibited Van Zuylen's attempt to use a national trademark right to prevent importation of German Hag coffee. The Court observed that
"there is no legal, financial, technical or economic link"'" between the Belgian and German holders of the Hag trademark,
and found that Article 85 did not apply when there is no such
connection.
The portion of the Hag judgment concerning Article 85(1)
confirms the holding of earlier cases that 85(1) does not apply
to the exercise of an intellectual property right in the absence
of any agreement. 2 As the Court held in Sirena v. Eda, the
exercise of a trademark right may come within the prohibition
of Article 85(1) "if it is the object, the means or the consequence of an agreement." 43 The Hag judgment, however, suggests that the Court concluded that the Hag trademark was
outside Article 85(1), since it was vested in different parties
not by a consensual arrangement but as a result of a wartime
confiscation.
In fact, however, Van Zuylen Freres acquired the Hag
trademark through an assignment agreement with Cafe Hag
S.A. Cannot Article 85 apply because of this agreement? In
Sirena, the Court said:
41.
42.
43.

Hag, supra note 38, at 9124.
See Sirena, supra note 30; Parke, Davis, supra note 30.
Sirena, supra note 30, at 7112.
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Article 85 of the Treaty is applicable where the trademark
right is invoked to prohibit imports of products coming
from other Member States and carrying the same trademark, if the owners of this trademark acquired the mark
or the right to use it under agreements between them or
agreements with third parties."
Hag and Sirena suggest that, for Article 85 to apply, the
agreements through which the concerned trademark holders
have acquired their trademarks must be parts of a complex of
agreements leading back to the same original trademark owner.
Analysis of the relationship between parties may be likened to
questions of proximate cause in the common law, insofar as
proximate cause analysis also considers whether intervening
events should interrupt the attribution back of later occurrences to given parties.
Thus, 85(1) did apply in Sirena because both the Italian
and German owners of the "Prep" trademark acquired their
rights from the same American firm; whereas, in Hag, the Cafe
Hag/Van Zuylen agreement was not, because of wartime confiscation, part of a complex of agreements leading back to the
source of the Hag A.G. trademark. In ReAdvocaat Zwarte Kip,
the Commission applied a similar rule:
So long as undertakings act in accordance with principles
which do not conform to the EEC Treaty in the field of
trademark rights, Article 85 of the Treaty will be applicable, provided the circumstances are such as to constitute
an infringement of the article and that, in particular, there
exist links of a legal, financial, technical or economic na5
ture between two current owners.
The Commission's test thus has been formulated on the
basis of a phrase from the Hag judgment: "legal, financial,
technical or economic link."' 6
The Centrafarm cases. 7 These cases concerned patents
held by Sterling Drug, an American pharmaceutical company,
in various countries including the Netherlands and Great Britain for a particular drug used in the treatment of urinary tract
infections. This substance was sold under the trademark Ne44. Id.at 7113.
45. Re Advocaat Zwarte Kip, Commission Decision of July 24, 1974, [Aug.,
1974] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 237) 12, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9669, at 9493-11.
46. Hag, supra note 38, at 9124.
47. Centrafarm cases, supra note 39.
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gram. Centrafarm, without the consent of Sterling, imported
Negram into the Netherlands from Germany and Great Britain.
Sterling, relying on its Dutch patent, and Sterling's Dutch
subsidiary, Winthrop, relying on the trademark Negram, petitioned a Dutch court for interim relief including an injunction.
The Dutch court granted Winthrop the requested relief, but
refused Sterling's petition. Both cases eventually reached the
Dutch Supreme Court, the Hoge Raad, on appeal.
The Hoge Raad referred certain questions to the Court of
Justice pursuant to Article 1774 including the following which
dealt with Article 85:
[Re: Sterling]
(a) Does the fact that a patentee owns parallel patents in
different countries belonging to the EEC and that he has
in those countries granted to different undertakings associated with the patentee licenses to manufacture and sell
(assuming that [all of] the agreements entered into with
such licensees are exclusively or in part designed to regulate differently for the different countries the conditions on
the market in respect of the goods protected by the patent)
mean that this is a case of agreement or concerted practices of the type prohibited by Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
and must an action for infringement as referred to under
I(a) above-to the extent that this must be regarded as the
result of such agreements or concerted practices-for that
reason be treated as unlawful?
(b) Is Article 85 also applicable if, in connection with
agreements of concerted practices as they are referred to,
it is only undertakings belonging to the same concern that
are involved?"
[Re: Winthrop]
[Does the situation in which]
(1) different undertakings in different countries belonging to the EEC forming part of the same concern are entitled to the use of the same trademark for a certain product;
(2) products bearing that trademark, after being lawfully
marketed in one country by the trademark owner, are exported by third parties and are marketed and further
traded in one of the other countries;
48. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 76. For the text
of Article 177, see note 120 infra.
49. Sterling, supra note 39, at 9151-47 (translation from COMM. MKT. L.R.).
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(3) the trademark laws in the last-mentioned country
give the trademark owner the right to take legal action to
prevent the trademarked goods from being marketed there
by other persons, even if such goods had previously been
marketed lawfully in another country by an undertaking
there entitled to that trademark and belonging to the same
concern . . . involve practices of the kind prohibited by

Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, and must an action for infringement as mentioned therein, insofar as it is to be
such practices, be held imregarded as a consequence 5of
0
permissible for this reason?

The judgments in the Centrafarm cases were virtually
identical. In both, the Court confirmed the enterprise-entity
doctrine discussed below. In response to the second question
posed by the Hoge Raad with respect to Sterling it held:
Article 85 of the Treaty does not apply to agreements or
concerted practices between undertakings belonging to the
same group in the form of parent company and subsidiary,
if the undertakings form an economic unit within which
the subsidiary does not have real autonomy in determining
its line of conduct on the market and if the agreements or
practices have the aim of establishing an internal distribution of tasks between the undertakings. 5 '
The Court left open the question of whether Article 85(1)
applies to agreements between the holder of parallel patents
and his licensees if, taken together, the goal of the agreements
and concerted practices is to sell the patented product under
varying conditions in various member states.
The enterprise-entity doctrine provides that if a parent
company controls and determines the policy of its subsidiary
so that the subsidiary cannot act autonomously, both are
treated as constituting one undertaking." Article 85(1) does
not apply to such undertakings since agreements between parents and subsidiaries are treated as methods of internal organization, and since there is deemed to be no competition between
parts of the same entity."3 The doctrine has also been used to
50.

Winthrop, supra note 39, at 9151-60, -61 (translation from COMM. MKT. L.R.).

51.

Sterling, supra note 39, at 9151-58 (translation from COMM. MKT. L.R.).

52. ICI, supra note 16; Begeulin, infra note 101; Christiani & Nielson, Commission Decision of June 18, 1969, [June, 1969] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) 12, [19709308
1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
[hereinafter cited as Christiani & Nielson].
53. See Christiani & Nielson, supra note 52, at 8659.
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attribute actions of a subsidiary to a parent. 4 The Centrafarm
judgments basically affirm this doctrine.
In his submission, the Advocate-General urged that the
Sterling corporate structure presented an exception to the enterprise-entity doctrine and thus, Article 85 was applicable.
He noted that even though the Court had held in previous
cases that Article 85 did not apply to agreements between
parents and subsidiary companies, it had tended to emphasize
the lack of autonomy of the subsidiaries and the unitary character of the group or economic entity. He therefore suggested
that previous decisions of the Court were not intended to foreclose the applicability of Article 85 to agreements between
members of the same group, especially when the agreements
"have the object or effect of restricting the freedom of competition of third parties." The Court, however, did not adopt the
Advocate-General's interpretation of the enterprise-entity
doctrine relating to third parties. 5
The EMI cases." Here, the Court of Justice was forced to
consider whether a trademark right might qualify as an agreement or concerted practice and whether the holding of such a
right might constitute a dominant position.
The pattern of events leading up to the cases was somewhat complex. Basically, in 1931, through a series of assignments and transfers, Electric and Musical Industries, Ltd.
(EMI), an English concern, acquired the "Columbia" trademark in England and several European countries. Through a
similar series of transactions, culminating in the 1950's, CBS,
Inc. (then named Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.) acquired the American "Columbia" trademarks, and also gained
the "Columbia" trademarks in a variety of other countries. 7
54. See Europemballage Corp. v. EEC Comm'n, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171 (Ct. J. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Continental Can].
55. Winthrop, supra note 39, at 9152.
56. EMI, supra note 40.
57. This situation was summarized by the Court of Justice, London, as follows:
(6) For some years well prior to the Second World War the trademark
X currently owned by A and B in their respective territories was held by
the same inter-related undertakings. (A having acquired its rights to the
trademark X by virtue of arrangements made between the predecessors
in title and the predecessors in title of B at a time when such predecessors
in title were wholly-owned subsidiary and parent companies respectively), but ownership of the trademark X now owned by B has changed
hands on a number of occasions.
EMI Records, Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom, Ltd., [1976 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH)
8350, at 7340 (Ct. J. 1976) [hereinafter cited as EMI-United

Kingdom].
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Based on its acquisition of the Columbia trademarks, CBS sold
records in several member states under the Columbia label.
EMI brought actions in the national courts of the United
Kingdom, Denmark, and the Federal Republic of Germany
against the CBS subsidiaries in those countries. EMI claimed
that CBS's sale of records bearing the "Columbia" mark in
those countries constituted an infringement of its trademark
rights. CBS defended on the basis of the Community principles
of free movement of goods and freedom of competition, alleging
they prevented EMI from enforcing its claimed trademark
rights.
The three national courts, in accordance with Article 177
of the EEC Treaty, requested rulings on the same fundamental
questions. The High Court of Justice in London, for example,
asked:
Should the provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and in particular the provisions laying down the principles of community law and the
rules relating to the free movement of goods and to competition be interpreted as disentitling A from exercising its
rights in the trademark under the appropriate national law
in every member state to prevent:
(i) The sale by B in each member state of goods

bearing mark X manufactured and marked with the
mark X by B outside the community in a territory

where he is entitled to apply the mark X, or
(ii) the manufacture by B in any member state of
goods bearing the mark X?8
The three cases were later joined by the Court of Justice. In the
consolidated cases the Court of Justice ruled that:
1. The principles of Community law and the provisions
on the free movement of goods and on competition do not
prohibit the proprietor of the same mark in all the Member
States of the Community from exercising his trademark
rights, recognized by the national laws of each Member
State, in order to prevent the sale or manufacture in the
Community by a third party of products bearing the same

mark, which is owned in a third country, provided that the
exercise of the said rights does not manifest itself as the
result of an agreement or of concerted practices which have
as their object or effect the isolation or partitioning of the
common market.
58.

Id.
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2. Insofar as that condition is fulfilled the requirement
that such third party must, for the purposes of his exports
to the community, obliterate the mark on the products
concerned and perhaps apply a different mark forms part
of the permissible consequences of the protection which
the national laws of each member state afford to the proprietor of the mark against the importation of products
from third countries bearing a similar or identical mark."
In regard to Article 85, the Court stated that a trademark
right did not qualify per se as an agreement or concerted practice. ® It noted, however, that the exercise of such a right might
come within Article 85 as part of a restrictive practice." When
the results of trademark agreements do not exceed those which
are permitted by the simple exercise of trademark rights under
national law, however, Article 85 will not apply.
Thus, when manufacturer X is still able to obtain access
to all of a market in which corporation Y is exercising trademark rights, albeit without being able to use the same trademarks as Y, the courts are likely to find that the exercise of
trademark rights by Y does not exceed the results generally
permitted under national law. In this situation, the courts generally will not find that EEC rules have been violated.
The most important issue raised by the EMI cases is
whether Article 85 can apply to situations in which there are
no longer subsisting agreements. CBS argued that, where a
terminated agreement still produced effects in the Community, it provided a possible basis for an Article 85 proceeding.
Advocate-General Warner challenged this position. Warner
argued that the Treaty of Rome was not intended to be retroactive in its application.2 Thus, he contended that it should not
apply to consequences generated by agreements terminated
before the Treaty was in force.
The Court appeared to come down somewhere between
these opposing views. It accepted the idea that Article 85 could
apply to terminated agreements; however, for it to be applied,
the Court required that the aftereffects of such an agreement
be greater than those legally possible by mere exercise of na59. EMI Records, Ltd. v. CBS Schallplatten GmbH, [1976 Transfer Binder]
REP. (CCH) 8352, at 7430 (Ct. J. 1976) [hereinafter cited as EMI-

COMM. MKT.

CBS].
60. Id. at 7429.
61. Id.
62. EMI-United Kingdom, supra note 57, at 7374.
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tional trademark rights." It also required that it be possible to
infer the existence of elements of concerted practice from the
behavior of the involved parties."
The Court could have refused to invoke Article 85 on the
grounds that no "legal, financial, technical, or economic link"
was present between the parties. 5 The Court ignored this proffered standard, however, and looked instead to the present
restrictive impact of the past agreement. Upon completing this
examination the Court of Justice determined that Article 85
was not applicable, since CBS could still gain access to the
market without the contested "Columbia" mark.6"
Another aspect of the applicability of Article 85 which the
Court was forced to consider was whether the market allocation
agreements in the instant case were the proper subject of Community concern insofar as their effect on trade was not largely
intra-Common Market. Under Article 85, agreements, decisions, and concerted practices "which may affect trade between Member States," or prevent, restrict or distort
"competition within the common market," come within its
purview. The allocation agreements of EMI and CBS, however,
were with third countries primarily. Thus, the major impact on
trade was with third countries instead of within the Common
Market. The Court, though, reaffirmed its earlier judgment
that an agreement which produces effects in the Common Market would potentially come within Article 85 even though the
agreement was with an undertaking in a third, nonmember
country. 7 The Court expanded this principle in EMI/CBS:
A restrictive agreement between traders within the Common Market and competitors in third countries that would
bring about an isolation of the Common Market as a whole
which, in the territory of the Community, would reduce
the supply of products originating in third countries which
are similar to those protected by a mark within the Community might be of such a nature as to affect adversely the
conditions of competition within the Common Market.68
63. EMI-CBS, supra note 59, at 7429.
64. Id.
65. See text accompanying note 41 supra. There is considerable doubt, however,
that this was in fact the case, as contractual links did exist. Hay & Oldekop, EMI/CBS
and the Rest of the World: Trademark Rights and the European Communities, 25 AM.
J. Comp. L. 120, 142 (1977) (citing the oral arguments of the British and German
governments).
66. See EMI-CBS, supra note 59, at 7429.
67. Beguelin, infra note 101.
68. EMI-CBS, supra note 59, at 7429.
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While the connection between the trademark agreement running to a concern in the third country and the effect upon
Common Market competition still seems extraordinarily tenuous in this formulation, nonetheless the Court has firmly proclaimed that such effects may well exist, at least as far as its
purposes are concerned. Thus the Court has adopted an approach which the Commission has used for several years. 9
Finally, it is worth noting that the Court did not concern
itself with distinguishing between the licensing and assigning
of trademarks. This affirms the Hag and Centrafarm7 ' cases
which largely eliminate the significance of such differences.
Exclusive Distributorships
Exclusive distributorship agreements provide that one
party will supply products in a certain territory only to another
party. Such agreements are prohibited if they fall within Article 85(1);72 however, contracts which merely grant exclusive
distributorship rights do not necessarily come under this provision.73 Contracts which provide absolute territorial protection
are almost always prohibited." Thus, a provision requiring that
the supplier prohibit other distributors from exporting into the
contract area would be void, as would a provision prohibiting
the distributor from exporting into other contract areas. 5
To aid in the administration of Article 85, the Commission
was given the authority by Council Regulation 19/6578 to grant
a "bloc"" exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of distribution agreements which would otherwise be prohibited by Article 85(1). This power was exercised
by the Commission in Regulation 67/67. 71
69. See, e.g., Duro-Dyne/Europair, Commission Decision of Dec. 19, 1974, [Feb.,
1975] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 29) 11, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9708A.
70. Hag, supra note 38.
71. Centrafarm cases, supra note 39.
72. See, e.g., Consten & Grundig, supra note 18.
73. See Technique Minire, supra note 14.
74. Pittsburgh Corning Europe, Commission Decision of Nov. 23, 1972, [Dec.,
19721 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35, [1968-1975 Restrictive Practices Supp.] COMM.
MKT. L. R. D2; Omega, supra note 14. See also Consten & Grundig, supra note 18.
75. See Consten & Grundig, supra note 18.
76. Council Regulation 19/65, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2724 (1965).
77. A "bloc" exemption is an exemption from Article 85(1) granted to certain
categories of agreements, decisions or practices.
78. Commission Regulation 67/67, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
2727 (1967)
(amended 1972).
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Regulation 67/67 exempts (until December 31, 1982)" 9
agreements and concerted practices pursuant to which the supplier agrees to sell only to the distributor for resale within a
defined area of the Common Market, or the distributor agrees
to buy only from the supplier, or both." Apart from this exclusive purchase obligation, the only other restrictions upon competiti6n which can be imposed upon the distributor are:
(a) Covenants not to compete: in an agreement exempted under Regulation 67/67 an obligation not to manufacture
or distribute competing goods during the duration of the contract and for one year thereafter,8 and an obligation not to
seek customers or to establish a branch or warehouse outside
of the contract territory. Thus, although the inclusion of a term
prohibiting the distributor from seeking customers outside his
area is permitted, the benefit of the bloc exemption will be lost
if the distributor is prohibited from selling outside his area. 2
(b) Provisions to insure minimum distributor service
which obligate the distributor to: purchase a complete line of
goods; buy a minimum quantity; sell in the packages specified
by the supplier or under his tradenames; or promote sales by
advertising, by maintaining a sales network or stock of goods,
by providing after-sales service, or by employing a staff with
specialized skills. 3
The Regulation 67/67 exemption does not apply to:
(a) Intrastate matters: agreements or practices if all
the parties belong to one member state and the goods are sold
in that state.84 Such agreements are not likely to affect intermember trade and, therefore, will rarely fall within the scope
of Article 85(1).11
(b) Horizontal restraints: agreements whereby competitors grant exclusive selling rights to each other. 8 Market shar79. Commission Regulation 2591/72, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727A n..01
2727
(1972) (amending Commission Regulation 67/67, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
(1967)).
2727A
80. Commission Regulation 67/67, art. 1, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
(1967).
81. Id. art. 2(1)(a), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) at 2727B.
82. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
83. Id. art. 2(2).
84. Id. art. 1(1), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) at 2727A.
85.

COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

51 (1972).
86. Commission Regulation 67/67, art. 3(a), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
(1967).

2727C

366
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ing may result from such arrangements. 7
(c) Certain Article 36 rights: cases where the parties exercise intellectual property rights or take other measures to
88
prevent parallel imports.
Of course, the apparent rigidity of these categories may be
misleading, particularly because individual, as opposed to
"bloc," exemptions may be granted to exclusive distrigutorship agreements pursuant to Article 85(3). s" Such exemptions
fall outside the ambit of Regulation 67/67. From 1974 to 1977,
the Court of Justice decided four pivotal cases" involving exclusive dealing agreements, a discussion of which follows.
PublicProsecutorv. Dassonville.Dassonville involved several dozen bottles of "Johnnie Walker" and "Vat 69" scotch
whiskey which were imported from France by the Dassonvilles
87. Wild & Leitz, Commission Decision of Feb. 23, 1972, [March, 1972] J.O.
COMM. EUR. (No. L 61) 27, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 9496.
88. Commission Regulation 67/67, art. 3(b), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727C
(1967).
89. See, e.g., Sopelem-Langen, supra note 28; Omega, supra note 14; FN-CF,
supra note 24.
90. De Norre v. N.V. Brouwerij Concordia, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH)
8386 (Ct. J. 1977) [hereinafter cited as De Norre]; S.A. Fonderies
Roubaix-Wattrelos v. Soci~tk Nouvelle des Fonderies A. Roux, [1976 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8341 (Ct. J. 1976) [hereinafter cited as RoubaixWattrelos]; Van Vliet Kwasten-en Ladderfabriek N.V. v. Fratelli Dalle Crode, [1975
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8314 (Ct. J. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Van Vliet]; Public Prosecutor v. Dassonville, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8276 (Ct. J. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Dassonville].
One further case, Ufficio Henry Van Ameyde v. Ufficio Centrale Italiano di Assistenza Assicurativa Automobilisti, 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8425 (Ct. J. 1977), was
decided recently on the basis of Articles 85, 86 and 90, among others. The fact situation
was interesting, but the judgment did not break any new ground whatsoever, so it is
consigned to the burial ground of this footnote. The complex set of facts basically
involved a complaint that Italy was restricting competition in the "loss adjustment"
insurance field by granting a legal monopoly to the defendant, pursuant to a Community agreement authorizing restricted competition, to settle accident claims made
by and against foreign drivers, when in Italy. The plaintiff, an Italian subsidiary of a
Dutch company operating as a loss adjuster-investigating accidents and advising the
insurer as to the nature and extent of damages and liability-maintained that it was
unable to carry on its business after Italy granted the defendant the monopoly to settle
claims. While other issues were also involved, for our purposes it is sufficient to state
that the Court of Justice determined that no Community agreement could be regarded
as authorizing the restriction of competition in the insurance field, nor did Italy's grant
of monopoly power for the settling of accident claims preclude the practice of loss
adjustment; but, if it were considered to have precluded this activity it may be prohibited by Article 90 taken in conjunction with Article 85 or 86.
This decision is not very significant insofar as it does not do much more than apply
a simple understanding of the competition, and other articles.

19781

EEC ANTITRUST LAW

into Belgium for sale in that country."' The whiskey had been
imported legally and cleared for customs purposes as
"community goods." The Dassonvilles had affixed on the original bottles before offering them for sale a printed label which
read in part as follows: "British Customs Certificate of
Origin."" 2
An inspector of foodstuffs found that the Dassonvilles did
not have in their possession certificates of origin for the whiskey
issued by the British government. The authenticity of the
goods was not questioned; however, the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the importers, alleging that
they had fraudulently attempted to induce a belief that they
were in possession of an official document certifying the origin
of the whiskey by attaching the lables to the bottles. He further
alleged that the Dassonvilles had contravened sections one and
four of Royal Decree 57 of 1934 "3 by importing whiskey bearing
the designation of origin adopted by the Belgian government
without an accompanying document certifying its right to the
"scotch whiskey" designation. "
In addition to the criminal prosecution, the exclusive distributors of the two brands of whiskey for Belgium, S.A. Ets
Fourcroy and S.A. Breuval et Cie, joined a civil claim in the
criminal proceedings against the Dassonvilles praying for compensation for their damages resulting from the Dassonvilles'
illegal importation.
The Dassonvilles argued that the exclusive distributors
had brought a civil claim merely to protect themselves from
parallel imports and that the exclusive distributorship agreements were void since they were being used in conjunction with
a national intellectual property law (the Royal Decree 57) to
prevent parallel imports. Therefore, the Belgian court referred
the following question to the European Court of Justice:
2. Is an agreement to be considered void if its effect is to
restrict competition and adversely to affect trade between
member-states only when taken in conjunction with national rules with regard to certificates of origin when that
agreement merely authorizes or does not prohibit the exclusive importer from exploiting that rule for the purpose
of preventing parallel imports? "
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Dassonville, supra note 90, at 7119.
Id.
Id. at 7119-20.
Id. at 7120.
Id.
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This question was phrased in such a way that there could
be little doubt as to the answer. As the Court of Justice noted:
"the fact that an agreement merely authorizes the concessionaire to exploit such a national rule or does not prohibit him
from doing so, does not
suffice, in itself, to render the agree9 8'
ment null and void.
Lord MacKenzie Stuart began discussion of the competition problem posed by the Belgian court by restating the established doctrine that exclusive dealing agreements prohibiting
parallel importers violate Article 85. Lord MacKenzie Stuart
however, went beyond this principle. He reasoned that an exclusive distributorship agreement could violate Article 85 if the
distributor was able to prevent other member states from sending parallel imports into the territory covered by the concession
by means of the agreement and a national law requiring the
exclusive use of certain means of proof of authenticity.97
Lord MacKenzie Stuart also indicated that, for the purpose of determining whether there has been such a violation,
one must look not only to the rights and obligations flowing
from the agreement but also to the relevant legal and economic
context. In particular, account should be taken of similar
agreements between the producer and exclusive distributors in
other member states.
Finally, Lord MacKenzie Stuart noted that in the Court's
judgment the existence of price differentials between member
states may instigate an inquiry "as to whether the exclusive
dealing agreement is being used to prevent importers from obtaining the necessary certificate of authenticity."" On this
point, the Advocate-General
suggested, in his submissions,
that the behavior of the Belgian exclusive distributors in requesting the criminal action and in instituting the civil actions
and of the French distributors in refusing to help the Dassonvilles obtain the certificate of origin could be evidence of a
concerted practice designed to ensure absolute territorial protection for each national market. The Advocate-General like96. Id. at 7130.
97. Id.at 7129.
98. Id. at 7129-30.
99. The Court of Justice is assisted by four Advocates-General. Their function
is to aid the Court in finding the law and rendering its decision. Advocates-General
do not represent any one party to the proceedings, but act impartially in assisting the
Court. The Court need not follow the Advocates-General's recommendations in rendering decisions. 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 4607 (1976).
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wise indicated that the use of such a concerted practice in close
conjunction with the exclusive dealing agreement could cause
the agreement to violate Article 85.' 00
In Dassonville, the Court of Justice reaffirmed its position
that the invocation of national law by an exclusive distributor
to ensure absolute territorial protection violates Article
85(1).101 Similarly, Dassonville aligns with previous precedent

in its determination that for the purpose of testing whether an
agreement enables a distributor to prevent parallel imports,
and therefore adversely affects trade between member states
and hinders competition, the agreement's legal and economic
context should be examined. 0 In this regard, the Court stated
that particular attention should be paid to "the possible existence of similar [exclusive distributorship] agreements conand concessionaires estabcluded between the same producer
'0 3
lished in other member-states.'
Finally, the Dassonville Court required the exclusive distributorship agreement to "adversely" affect trade between
member states to run afoul of 85(1). The German, Italian,
and Dutch texts of the treaty suggest that an agreement must
affect trade adversely to fall under Article 85(1);1°4 whereas,

in the French'05 and English versions, "affect" has no pejorative connotation. In this instance, the principles set forth in
Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome suggest that any restriction
on competition, within 85(1), which is capable of endangering
freedom of trade between member states in a way which
100. Id. at 7137-38 (opinion of Advocate-General Alberto Trabucchi).
101. The Court of Justice articulated this position in Beguelin Import Co. v.
G.L. Import-Export S.A., [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8149 (Ct. J. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Beguelin]. Dassonville differs from Beguelin
in one important respect. In the latter case, the national law was invoked by the
exclusive distributor; whereas, in the former, it was invoked by the public prosecutor.
Thus, as the Advocate-General observed with respect to the Dassonville facts, "the
obstacle to interstate trade and therefore to freedom of competition derives essentially
and directly from the national law itself." Dassonville, supra note 90, at 7137 (opinion
of Advocate General Alberto Trabucchi).
102. See Volk, supra note 19. In Technique Mini~re, supra note 14, the Court
decided that when examining a possible violation of Article 85(1) by an exclusive
distributorship agreement, a number of factors should be considered. One of these was
"the isolated nature of the agreement in question or its place among a network of
agreements." Id. at 7696.
103. Dassonville, supra note 90, at 7129.
104. The German text reads "welche den Handel Zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten
zu beeintrachtigen geeignet," the Dutch version uses "onganstig . . .beinuloeden,"
and the Italian uses "preguidicare."
105. The French text reads "qui sont susceptibles d'affecter le commerce entre
etats membres .. " 1 COMM.MKT. REP. (CCH) 2005.
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could hinder the development of a single market between
such states, "affects" trade for purposes of Articles 85 and
86.101 Thus, the adverse effect which is prohibited is not that
on trade only, but that on the Community objectives of a
single market. Similarly, it has been suggested that a restriction on competition that may potentially prove unfavorable to
trade between member states is prohibited. 07
Van Vliet Kwasten-en LadderfabriekN. V. v. FratelliDalle
08 In
Crode.1
a contract dated February 25, 1968 Fratelli Dalle
Crode, an Italian manufacturer of plastic brushes, appointed
Van Vliet Kwasten-en Ladderfabriek N.V., a Dutch company,
as its exclusive distributor for the Benelux countries. The contract provided that Dalle Crode would ensure that its products
delivered to wholesalers, manufacturers, and other customers
in Italy would not be exported to the Benelux territory. In
order to fulfill this provision, Dalle Crode was required to
notify its customers of the restriction on export in brochures,
offers, price lists, and invoices "before or during the preparation of the contracts of sale."'' 9 Dalle Crode also had to expressly prohibit the export or the causing of export to the
Benelux territory by buyers in Italy when it delivered branded
articles.
On September 28, 1969 Dalle Crode rescinded the contract. Because of the recission, Van Vliet refused to pay Dalle
Crode after certain deliveries. Dalle Crode then sued Van Vliet
for payment before the court of first instance at Arnhem. Van
Vliet counterclaimed, praying for damages for breach of contract.
Dalle Crode argued that the contract was null and void
because the export restrictions conflicted with Article 85(1)
and because Regulation 67/6710 was inapplicable.
After judgment for Dalle Crode, Van Vliet appealed arguing, inter alia, that the contract with Dalle Crode was ex106. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 3(f), 298 U.N.T.S. 16.
107. In Consten & Grundig, supra note 18, the Court discussed the phrase,
"which may affect trade between member states": "It is necessary in particular to
know whether the agreement is capable of endangering, either directly or indirectly,
in fact or potentially, freedom of trade between member states in a direction which
could harm the attainment of the objects of a single market between states." Id. at
7652. Thus, the adverse effect which ii prohibited is not that on trade only, but that
on the Community objectives of a single market.
108. Van Vliet, supra note 90.
109. Id.at 7660.
110. Commission Regulation 67/67, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727 (1967); see
text accompanying notes 79-89 supra.
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empted by Regulation 67/67 because parallel imports of Dalle
Crode products into the Benelux countries were still available
from West Germany and France. The court of appeals found
that the applicability of Regulation 67/67 depended upon the
interpretation of Article 3"' of that Regulation.
It, therefore, referred the following questions to the Court
of Justice:
1. Do the agreements which by Article 3 are excluded
from exemption also include exclusive dealing agreements
between a manufacturer in one of the member states and
an exclusive dealer elsewhere within the common market
which contain provisions upon compliance with which only
manufacturers and dealers in the member state of the contracting party/manufacturer are prevented from disposing
of the goods to the territory covered by the contract while
dealers and consumers in the territory covered by the contract are prevented only from acquiring the goods from the
member state of the contracting party/manufacturer?
2. In answering the first question, would it make any
difference: (a) if dealers and consumers in the territory
covered by the contract do-or do not-in practice continue to be able to obtain the goods from elsewhere in the
common market outside the territory covered by the contract and from outside the member state of the contracting
party/manufacturer; and (b) if, to the extent to which such
a possibility continues to exist in practice, dealers and
consumers in the territory covered by the contract do-or
do not-in complying with the provisions in the contract
referred to under 1 refrain to a noticeable degree from making use of that possibility?"'
In response, the Court of Justice noted that Regulation
111. Article 3 reads as follows:
Article (1) of this regulation shall not apply where: (a) manufacturers of
competing goods entrust each other with exclusive dealing in those goods;
(b) the contracting parties make it difficult for intermediaries or consumers to obtain the goods to which the contract relates from other dealers
within the common market, in particular where the contracting parties:
(i) exercise industrial property rights to prevent dealers or consumers
from obtaining from other parts of the common market or from selling in
the territory covered by the contract goods to which the contract relates
which are properly marked or otherwise properly placed on the market;
(ii) exercise other rights or take other measures to prevent dealers or
consumers from obtaining elsewhere goods to which the contract relates
or from selling them in the territory covered by the contract.
Council Regulation 67/67, art. 3, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727C (1967).
112. Van Vliet, supra note 90, at 7660.
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67/67 exempts certain exclusive dealing agreements from Article 85(1) because of "the advantages which . . .such agreements afford for the improvement and the continuity of supplies as well as the continuance of the competition system to
the benefit of particular small and medium size undertakings.""' It indicated that Article 3(b) of Regulation 67/67 provides that there is no exemption if:
the contracting parties make it difficult for intermediaries
or consumers to obtain the goods to which the contract
relates from other dealers within the common market, in
particular where the contracting parties . . .take other
measures to prevent dealers or consumers from obtaining
from elsewhere goods to which the contract relates or from
selling them in the territory covered by the contract."'
Thus, according to the Court, for the Regulation 67/67
exemption from Article 85(1) to be available to the contracting
parties, their agreement must not cause difficulty in the procuring of goods within the Common Market, result in the partitioning of markets, or prevent parallel imports. The Dalle
Crode/Van Vliet agreement ran afoul of these criteria and fell
within the provision quoted above, Article 3(b)(2) of Regulation 67/67. The requirement of the contract that Dalle Crode
prevent exports by third parties, which the Court calls "an
encroachment on the freedom of action of . . . [these] parties," is not a restriction which is permitted in exclusive dealing agreements exempted by Regulation 67/67. This prevention
of parallel imports from Italy hindered dealers and consumers
in the Benelux countries in obtaining supplies.
The Court further found that a real possibility, whether
exercised or not, of parallel imports from member states other
than Italy would not save the contract from being excluded
from the Regulation 67/67 exemption because, such possibility
notwithstanding, the parallel import of a substantial quantity
of the articles in question would still be prevented by the agreement.
Thus, the Court of Justice concluded that an exclusive
distributing agreement between a manufacturer in one member state and a dealer in another does not come within the
Regulation 67/67 exemption if the agreement requires the man113. Id. at 7664.
114. Id. (quoting Council Regulation 67/67, art. 3(b)(3), 1
(CCH) 2727C (1967)).
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ufacturer to prohibit the export by buyers in their state to the
territory covered by the contract "where it has the effect of
making it impossible for dealers and consumers in that territory to acquire a substantial quantity of the goods directly from
the manufacturer's state.""' 5
Van Vliet reaffirmed the principle that Regulation 67/67
does not apply if the contracting parties prevent parallel imports into the exclusive distributor's territory."' The Court,
furthermore, expanded and clarified this principle by holding
Regulation 67/67 inapplicable if the parties prohibited parallel
imports from the supplier's state, even if they allowed such
imports from other member states.
The Court did not consider the situation where parallel
imports from the supplier's state are permitted, but where such
imports from another member state are prohibited. It seems
reasonable to assume that the Court, following the policy of
free parallel imports, would hold that Regulation 67/67 would
not be applicable to such a contract.
S.A. FonderiesRoubaix-Wattrelos v. Soci~t6 Nouvelle des
Fonderies A. Roux. "I Roubaix involved a contract dated June
29, 1963, by which Gontermann-Pelpers (Gopag), a German
company, granted Les Fonderies de Roubaix-Wattrelos (Roubaix), a French concern, the exclusive right to sell Gopag iron
in the northern part of France. This exclusive right was later
expanded to include all of France. Roubaix agreed not to compete with Gopag in the manufacture of iron products or to
perform any work for Gopag's competitors. The Commission
was given notification of these arrangements on September 8,
1966.
On October 6, 1964, an agreement parallel to the above
was entered into by Roubaix and Fondries A. Roux (Roux),
which granted Roux the exclusive right to resell Gopag products in southern France. Roux also agreed not to compete with
Gopag and acknowledged that this agreement was subordinate
to, and dependent for its validity on the Gopag-Roubaix agreement. The Commission was not notified of this agreement. In
March, 1972, Roux purchased Swiss iron castings, precipitating the institution of an action against it by Roubaix. Roubaix
charged that Roux had breached its agreement not to compete
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 7665.
This principle was established in Begeulin, supra note 101, at 7704-05.
Roubaix-Wattrelos, supra note 90.
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with Roubaix's own supplier, Gopag, upon which Roubaix was
contractually dependent for supplies of iron. Roubaix feared
that those supplies might be cut off if it, or an enterprise connected to it, breached the non-competition agreement. Roux
defended on the ground that the Roubaix-Gopag agreement
was void because it conflicted with Article 85, and that as a
result, the Roux-Roubaix agreement was also void.
In reversing the lower court and holding for Roubaix, 18 the
court of appeals in Paris reasoned that the original notification
to the Commission provided "provisional validity" for the later
Roubaix-Gopag agreement until such time as the Commission
rendered a decision on its propriety. Provisional validity, it
should be noted, is a term signifying that a given action, here
notification, is sufficient tQ provide immunity to liability which
otherwise might arise. The validity is effective only until a
court ruling provides differently. At that time, liability may
arise for similar acts committed after the ruling.
In regard to the Roux-Roubaix agreement, the court of
appeals decided that because it was between enterprises within
one state covering sales within that state, the exemption covering certain interstate agreements provided in Regulation 67/67
did not apply. For that reason the French court looked instead
to Article 4(2)(1).of Regulation 17111 to determine whether the
agreement was valid under Article 85.
Article 4(2)(1) of Regulation 17 provides that notification
of agreements to the Commission is necessary unless: (1) the
only parties to the agreement are from one member state and
(2) the agreements do not relate to exports or imports between
member states.
Upon examining Regulation 17, the court of appeals concluded that, if its notification requirement was applicable, it
must be met as a prerequisite to obtaining an individual exemption under Article 85(3). Therefore, the French court, pursuant to Article 177,12° requested that the Court of Justice give
118. Id. at 7208.
119. Council Regulation 17, art. 4(2), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2431 (1971).
120. Article 177 reads as follows:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of
the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an
act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
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a preliminary ruling on whether the Roux-Rouxbaix agreement related "either to imports or to exports between Member
States" under Article 85.
The Court of Justice framed the question before it in the
following fashion:
[Wihether, assuming that this subconcession agreement
is covered by the prohibition in Article 85(1) and does not
benefit from the exemption applying to certain categories
of agreements contained in Article 1 of Commission Regulation No. 67/67 . . ., it requires preliminary notification
in order to benefit under Article 85(3) from an individual
exemption from prohibition.'
In defining the parameters of the exemption from Regulation 17's notification requirement for agreements which do not
relate to exports or imports between member states, the Court
considered the Regulation's goal of simplifying administrative
procedure.' When read in conjunction with Article 85(1) and
(3), the Court reasoned that Article 4 of Regulation 17 was
designed to take out from under the general sweep of Article
85(1) the less harmful agreements which would probably qualify under Article 85(3) as exempt in any case. The Court further
stated that the fact that the products to be marketed were
previously imported from another member state was not determinative of whether the second condition was met. Therefore,
the Roux-Rouxbaix agreement, which applied to marketing
solely within a member state, was exempt from the notification
requirements. 3
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter
before the Court of Justice.
Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 76-77.
121. Roubaix-Wattrelos, supra note 90, at 7211.
122. Id.
123. The Court answered the first question as follows:
(1) To the extent to which it exempts from notification agreements
which do not relate either to imports or to exports, Article 4(2)(1) of
Council Regulation No. 17 must be interpreted as extending to agreements granting exclusive sales concessions in relation to the marketing
of goods, where the marketing envisaged by the agreement takes place
solely within the territory of the Member State to whose laws the under-
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While the instant case required only a decision as to the
need for notification, the issue of what type of agreement was
to be granted an exemption under Regulation 67/67 would
eventually require interpretation.
Therefore, the Court of Justice went on to discuss the proper interpretation of Regulation 67/67 in relation to this type
of restrictive agreement. Article 1(2) of Regulation 67/67 provides that exclusive distributorship agreements between parties in the same member state are not covered by Regulation
67/67.124 According to the Court, Article 1(2) only applies to

intrastate exclusive distributorship agreements Which do not
affect trade between member states; 2 5 intrastate exclusive distributorship agreements which do affect trade between member states do not fall under Article 1(2) of Regulation 67/67
and, therefore, can benefit from the bloc exemption provided
by that Regulation.
Even though intrastate exclusive distributorship agreements which do not affect trade between member states cannot
benefit from the Regulation 67/67 exemption, such agreements
do not violate Article 85(1) since they do not affect trade be26
tween member states.1

Prior to the Rouxbaix decision, intrastate exclusive distributorship agreements which did affect trade between member states were treated as not being able to benefit from Regulation 67/67,27 which resulted in the anomalous situation that
takings are subject, even if the goods in question have at a former stage
been imported from another Member State.

Id. at 7212-13.
124. Article 1 of Regulation 67/67 reads as follows:
1. Pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty and subject to the provisions
of this regulation it is hereby declared that until December 31, 1982,
Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to agreements to which only
two undertakings are party and whereby:
(a) one party agrees with the other to supply only to that other
certain goods for resale within a defined area of the common market; or
(b) one party agrees with the other to purchase only from that other
certain goods for resale; or
(c) the two undertakings have entered into obligations, as in (a)
and (b) above, with each other in respect of exclusive supply and purchase for resale.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements to which undertakings
from one Member State only are party and which concern the resale of
goods within that Member State.
Commission Regulation 67/67, art. 1, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727A (1972).
125. Rouxbaix-Wattrelos, supra note 90, at 7212.
126. Id.
127. See Goodyear Italiana-Euram, Commission Decision of Dec. 19, 1974,
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certain exclusive distributorship agreements which affected
trade between member states could take advantage of a group
exemption; whereas, other similar, and perhaps less harmful
agreements could not. The Rouxbaix decision resolves that
anomaly by limiting Article 1(2) of Regulation 67/67 to intrastate exclusive distributorship agreements which do not affect
trade between member states.
28
De Norre v. N. V. Brouwerij Concordia.' In De Norre, a
married couple took over a Belgian cafe and an existing obligation not to sell or stock beverages of any kind other than those
29
supplied by Concordia, a small brewer.' Concordia sued the
new owners after it learned that they were selling other beverages. The initial action, in the Oudenaarde court of first instance, resulted in judgment for Concordia. The couple appealed to the Hof van Bereup, Ghent, claiming that their contract was not binding because it was void under Article 85 of
the EEC Treaty. 3 "
The Hof van Bereup, Ghent, stayed the proceedings to
refer seven questions to the Court of Justice. Only the second
question was actually answered by the Court, but the others
will be adverted to where called for below. The second question
referred was:
May it be deduced by analogy with the judgment in
Fonderies de Roubaix that the exemption by category laid
down by Regulation No. 67/67 of the Commission is
applicable to all exclusive dealing agreements of the type
at issue, concluded between undertakings in a single
Member-State? 3'
In replying to the above quoted second question, the Court
initially weaved its way through Regulation 67/67 which sets
out the types of agreements which are exempted from Article
85's coverage. The Court noted that Regulation 67/67 exempts
agreements to which only two organizations are party, but it
withholds this group exemption from exclusive dealing agreements when the two parties are from the same state. After
scanning Regulation 67/67 the Court of Justice refused to grant
[Feb., 19751 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 38) 10, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder, New Developmentsl COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9708.
128. De Norre, supra note 90.
129. Id. at 7921.

130. Id.
131.

Id. at 7922 (footnote omitted).
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a group exemption in the instant case. In so doing the court did
not condemn domestic agreements to Article 85's application;
it merely reasoned that because these domestic agreements
generally are thought to have so minimal an impact on trade
between member states, there is little need for an exemption
to protect them from an article which can seldom be used
against them. The Court then concluded its analysis of Regulation 67/67 by declaring that it does apply to exempt those
domestic exclusive dealing agreements "when by way of exception, they are caught by the prohibition contained in Article
85(1) of the Treaty" because they affect trade between member
states. "
In De Norre the Court fashioned a wide scope for the Article 85 group exemption. Its reading of Article 1 of Regulation
67/67 relied heavily on the policies underlying this whole area,
instead of being overly concerned with a narrow and literal
interpretation. A so-called literal interpretation restricting
group exemptions would have resulted in the curious anomaly
of multistate agreements being permitted, but domestic ones
not. The former are more likely to significantly and deleteriously affect the goal of an integrated and competitive Common Market than are the latter, so a "literal" reading of the
regulation without regard to its broader context would have
been counter productive.
The widening of the scope of the group exemption was also
based upon an expressed desire for legal certainty which was
said to be part of the reason for the existence of Regulation
67/67. The normal practice in applying the competition law is
to examine each small agreement to see whether it may be part
of a general pattern of similar agreements which, when taken
together, might be restrictive of competition.'33 Since the small
business owner frequently is unaware of these agreements, he
cannot readily be certain that an agreement into which he
entered is valid. Extension of the group exemption helps allay
these problems of uncertainty in planning at the small business
level.' Where an unacceptable web of agreements at this level
is thought to be too stifling to competition, the Commission is
132. Id. at 7940-43.
133. See id. at 7943; Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen (No.
1), [1967-1970
Court Decisions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8053 (Ct. J. 1967).
134. With the knowledge that a group exemption is more readily
available, a
small business owner can be more confident of the legal validity
of any local exclusive
dealing arrangement he enters into.
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still free to withdraw the group exemption."'
The extension of the group exemption is particularly reasonable in light of the small amount involved in these small
business situations and the large amount of expenditure that
would be required to adequately furnish a local court with market information.
Resale Price Maintenance
One aspect of restrictive competitive practices covered by
Article 85 involves vertical agreements. Vertical agreements
are those between suppliers of goods and the firms which later
resell those goods.'39 The issue of primary concern is how restrictive the supplier may be in imposing limitations regarding
resale upon the purchaser. The principal restriction is dictation
of the price, or of a minimum price, at which goods may be
resold. Such a restriction is termed "resale price maintenance.", 3"
The EEC's problems resulting from such price dictation
have not been significant, because it has been unusual for such
pricing schemes to have a truly interstate impact. National
laws of the member states generally regulate the practice, and
in any case, such a practice is difficult to continue where im3
ports of interchangeable products are available. ' Yet, to whatever extent a given firm or industry has market power within
a country, restriction of competition among middlemen may
help exploit that power." 9
The general approach of the Commission has been to allow
purely intrastate price maintenance schemes to operate unmolested on the ground that such schemes are primarily a national
40
concern rather than a Common Market problem. The Commission has chosen instead to prevent exploitation of monopoly
power in individual states where such power presents a Com135. It may do so under Article 7 of Regulation 19/65, quoted by the Court. De
Nore, supra note 90, at 7942.

136. See, e.g., C. BELLAMY & G.

CHILD, COMMON MARKEr LAW OF CoMPErrrION

(1973) [hereinafter cited as C. BELLAMY].
137. Id. at 63-73.
138. D. BAROUNOS, D. HALL & J. JAMES, EEC

ANTI-TRUST LAW; PRINCIPLES AND

PRACTICE 50 (1975) [hereinafter cited as D. BAROUNOS].
139. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
PERFORMANCE

140.

STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC

131-239 (1970).

See A. DERINGER,
24-28 (1968).

COMMUNITY

33

THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
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munity concern", by removing restrictions upon the free movement of goods so as to open individual markets to competition
from imports.42
Resale price maintenance schemes are open to attack
under Article 85(1), however, where there is an impact upon
trade between member states. The Commission, thus, has
found in two cases that resale price maintenance across the
boundaries of member states is an illegal restriction of competition. 43
In Groupement des Fabricantsde Papiers Peints de Belgique v. EEC Commission,' the Court of Justice further defined the type of pricing agreement that may violate Article
85(1). This case involved five Belgian companies who founded
the Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique
(The Group) in 1922 to help market wallpaper. In 1962, The
Group notified the Commission of its agreement that served to
fix quality standards, prices, resale prices, rebates, and also to
issue joint publicity.' 45 One member left The Group in 1963,
and sued the remaining four members in the Cour d'Appel de
Bruxelles. The court rendered a judgment favorable to the
plaintiff on the ground that The Group's joint efforts had infringed Belgian competition law.
In 1968, the Commission requested further information
from The Group because of the Belgian civil judgment. In answer to the Commission's questions, The Group stated that its
customers were under an obligation to adhere to its resale
prices in Belgium, but that no such restriction applied to export items.'4 6 In 1971, The Group learned that Mr. Pex, one of
its customers, was reselling wallpaper below the official list
price. For this reason, in March, 1972, The Group refused to
supply Mr. Pex. Subsequently, he complained to the Commission charging collective refusal of The Group to supply him
with wallpaper.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Re Deutsche Philips GmbH, Commission Decision of
Oct. 5, 1973,
[Oct. 1973] J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 293) 40, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder,
New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9606.
143. Id.; Re Du Pont de Nemours (Deutschland) GmbH, Commission
Decision
of June 14, 1973, IJuly, 19731 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 194) 27, [1973-1975
Transfer
Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9578 [hereinafter
cited as Du
Pont!.
144. (1976 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8335 (Ct. J. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Groupement].
145. Notification is required by Council Regulation 17, art. 5(1), 1 COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH)
2441 (1962); see text accompanying notes 277-283 infra.
146. Groupement, supra note 144, at 7104.
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The Commission initiated a proceeding and eventually
found that the boycott of Pex was an infringment of Article
85(1). The Group sought annulment of this decision before the
Court of Justice, claiming that the refusal to supply Pex did
not come under Article 85(1), or in the alternative, that the
fines imposed by the Commission were excessive."'
The Court of Justice observed that both systems of fixing
selling prices and of price listing that forbid announcement of
rebates are violative of Article 85(1). The Court noted, moreover, that the initial selling prices dictated to Group members
were controlled so as to eliminate all intragroup competition.
This practice clearly fell within the proscription of Article
85(1).
The Court of Justice affirmed the Commission's finding
that The Group had decided jointly to suspend delivery to Mr.
Pex. The structure of the agreement signed by all of The
Group's customers, which emphasized the penalties The Group
could enact for failure to follow the regimented pricing policy,
was considered to have restricted competition in Belgium and,
48
as a result, within the Common Market.'
The Court also concluded that a price-fixing agreement,
designed to operate only upon the marketing of products in one
member state, may nonetheless affect the Common Market
insofar as it tends to compartmentalize markets, causing national markets to be resistant to integration. The significance
of this effect is judged, the Court stated, by examining "the
means available to the parties to a restrictive agreement to
insure that customers remain loyal, the relative importance of
the agreement on the market concerned and the economic context in which it exists."' 49
The above statements notwithstanding, the Court found
that the Commission's decision lacked adequate explanation
and therefore overruled it. 50 The Court's rationale for overturning the Commission's decision was that it went beyond previous decisions in declaring that an intrastate agreement affected community trade, and that it failed to adequately substantiate this result. In other words, where a Commission decision breaks new ground, complete explanations are neces147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 7110 (art. 85(1)), 7114 (excessive fine).
Id. at 7118.
Id.
Id. at 7119.
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sary.' 5 ' In the instant case, the Commission did not set forth
facts to show that the small amount of Belgian market activity
affected by the subject agreement could have had an impact
upon trade between member states.
The Court did not reach the question of whether impact
upon local trade or impact upon Community trade is the relevant standard to be applied. Indeed, all of the Court's comments in this regard are dicta, albeit significant dicta. The
importance of a restriction upon Community trade is the criterion which should, of course, be used.'52
While the Commission did not properly document its case
here, in the past it has struck down price-fixing agreements
whose operation was limited to one country where they affected
imports to or exports from member states.'5 3 The Court of Justice has willingly supported these decisions.' 54 The instant case
may be distinguished on the ground that its impact upon interstate trade was not readily ascertainable, unlike some of the
earlier cases.
It is also worth noting that the Commission previously
indicated that when resale price maintenance agreements are
limited to a single member state, the situation is generally
within the sole competence of that state.'55 Apparently, the
reason the Commission adopted this position was that such
agreements were considered unlikely to affect Community
trade patterns.'50
Relevant Product Market
The determination of the relevant product market is always important in cases involving Article 86 and can be of
importance in those dealing with Article 85. One cannot determine in the abstract whether a dominant position exists;
rather, it is necessary to examine a firm's position in a particular product market in the "common market or a substantial
part of it" over a specified period.
Likewise, in applying Article 85, it is sometimes necessary
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
74-75.
156.
decisions

Id. at 7118.
Id.
See D. BARouNos, supra note 138, at 50.
Id.
See Du Pont, supra note 143. See generally C.

BELLAMY,

supra note 136, at

See C. BELLAMY, supra note 136, at 74-75 (no challenge to these Commission
has been allowed by the Court of Justice).
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to determine the relevant product market, particularly in examining the applicability of Article 85(3). The fourth requirement for exemption from 85(1) pursuant to 85(3) is that the
agreement, decision, or practice must not give the parties the
opportunity to eliminate competition in regard to a substantial
portion of the products in question. In order to ascertain
whether such a possibility exists, one first must decide which
goods are "the products in question," in other words, what is
the relevant product market? In 1974-1977, the Court of Justice decided one case, Kali & Salz A.G. v. EEC Commission,
under Article 85 and several cases under Article 86, in which
the determination of the relevant product market was an
issue.157
In Kali, Kali & Salz A.G. (K&S) and Kali-Chemie A.G.
(KC) were the only two producers of potash in Germany. K&S
was responsible for 88.9% of the German production in 1973,
while KC was responsible for 11.1%. On July 6, 1970, these two
companies entered into an agreement under which "KC supplies K&S with that part of KC's production which KC does
not market itself or which is not required for the manufacture
of its compound fertilizer RHE-KAPHOS, while K&S for its
part undertakes to purchase the surplus, the parties agreeing
moreover to draw up, each time for a period of two years, a
provisional plan for allocation of this production."'' 8 The Commission, in a decision of December 21, 1973,111 held that this
agreement infringed Article 85(1), refused an exemption for the
agreement, and ordered K&S to cease the infringement. On
March 11, 1974, the two companies brought an action for annulment of the Commission's decision.
The Commission had found that the relevant product
6 0 whereas,
market was "that of straight potash fertilizers";
the companies argued that the relevant product market was
that of straight potash fertilizers and compound potash fertilizers combined since these two projects were competitive and
interchangeable. The Court of Justice, opting for the companies' definition of product market, concluded that there was
competition between the products, which was "determined by
their price and their intrinsic advantages to the consumer."
Therefore, it reasoned there was no basis for the conclusion in

REP.

157. Kali & Salz A.G. v. EEC Comm'n, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
(CCH) 8284 (Ct. J. 1975).
158. Id. at 7248.
159. Id. at 7236.
160. Id. at 7249.
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the Commission's decision that "the declaration of inapplicability of Article 85(3) must in any case be refused because the
agreement affords the undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products
in question."''
Similarly, the Commission had ruled that the agreement
violated 85(1) because the spirit of the contract and the practice of the parties resulted in KC delivering its whole production to K&S. On the other hand, the companies argued that
KC could itself decide how much potash to deliver to K&S. The
Court found that the companies' contention was substantiated
by the fact that the part of KC's production sold to K&S was
decreasing; whereas, the production used in the preparation of
its compound fertilizers was increasing; that the contract was
designed to enable KC to concentrate on the production and
sale of its compound fertilizers; and that KC decided how
much potash to use for the compound product and then sold
any surplus to K&S. Thus, on the facts, the Court agreed with
the companies.'62
The Kali decision suggests that the operative concept in
the determination of a market is interchangeability of products. In United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., the
United States Supreme Court said:
The "market" which one must study to determine
when a producer has monopoly power will vary with the
part of the commerce under consideration. The tests are
constant. That market is composed of products that have
reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which
they are produced-price, use and qualities considered." 3
The European Court of Justice seems to have applied a
similar test in Kali. The Court found that the Commission
neglected to demonstrate that the two fertilizer products made
up two different markets although it failed to state firmly that
161. Id.
162. The Court also found that the Commission did not comply with Article 190,
since it did not give sufficient reasons for its decisions; the Court quashed the Commission's decision. Article 190 reads as follows: "The regulations, directives and decisions
of the Council and of the Commission shall be supported by reasons and shall refer to
any proposals or opinions which are to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty." Treaty
of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 190, 298 U.N.T.S. 79.
163. 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1955). See also Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor
Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957); Kansas City Star
Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); United
States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y.1965).
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the test to be used to determine product markets was that of
interchangeability. It did, however, note that in some years the
farmers buy one product, in other years the other, which goes
some distance towards establishing an interchangeability test.
This notion of interchangeability is discussed frequently
by economists in terms of "cross elasticity of demand."'' 4 This
is shorthand for a statistically-based approach which attempts
to measure the interrelationship between a seller's sales or output and a rival's change in product prices.6 5 Where products
are "reasonably interchangeable," changes in the price of one
should cause changes in purchasing behavior toward the other.
The more closely related the product, the greater the change
should be. Thus, calculations which demonstrate that slight
price changes in one product result in a large shift of buyers to
or from the other, indicate significant interchangeability and
should be taken as evidence that both products are part of the
same market. The Kali approach to product markets is thus
similar to that favored by economists, but it fails to adopt
explicitly enough the interchangeability approach which seems
desirable.
Agriculture-The Sugar Cartel
In most areas of endeavor, the EEC's Rules of Competition provide for the opening of markets to firms in different
states. The goal of Article 85 in particular is to eliminate barriers in order to promote competition and free trade.,6 The
agricultural sphere represents an exception to this approach,
however, insofar as the Treaty enables the Community to establish a centrally-controlled market structure for agricultural
projects.' Pursuant to this exception, the Council of Ministers
of the European Communities has set forth in Regulation 26/62
special rules for agricultural associations and agreements.'
This regulation exempts such associations and agreements
from the restrictions of Articles 85(1) and 86 where they "form
an integral part of a national market organization or are necessary for attainment of the objectives set out in Article 39 of the
Treaty."'6 6 The Article 39 objectives referred to are: (1) in164. G. STGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 31 (3d ed. 1966).
165. Id.
166. See D. BAROUNOS, supra note 138, at 1; C. BELLAMY, supra note 136,
46-49.
167. See generally D. BAROUNOS, supra note 138, at 242-45.
168. Council Regulation 26/62, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 935 (1962).
169. Id. art. 2(1), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 935B (1975).
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creased productivity; (2) a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; and (3) stable markets with ready supplies at reasonable prices.7 0 The Commission has the exclusive
power to decide which agreements or practices are covered by
the Regulation 26/62 exception to Articles 85 and 86.171
These overlapping policies of trying to establish, on the
one hand, a competitive market system, and, on the other
hand, a stable agricultural market are not necessarily compatible. Theoretically, competition provides an unstable market,
at least to the degree that firms will drop out or expand as their
relative efficiencies dictate.' The notion that stability was
needed in the agricultural products market is based on the
underlying idea that competition could grow "excessive"'73 and
thereby destructive of a smoothly functioning market. 7 ' The
result is that a balance is struck between the desire to have
competition and thus lower, though fluctuating, prices, and the
desire to have stability, and thus uniform and constant, though
generally higher, prices.' 75
On a practical level, the Commission manages the agricultural field pursuant to directions provided by the Council.'7 8
These directions dictate how particular products are to be
treated. However, the proper balancing of interests is still a
complex task. One strict requirement that aids the Commission in formulating its decisions is that an agreement or practice will not be exempt from Article 85(1), even if it produces
the overall goals discussed above, if other, less restrictive
177
means are available.

The European Sugar Cartel cases, 78 demonstrate the interrelation of the Community's agricultural policies and its
competition rules. Since the facts of the multiple Sugar Cartel
cases are too complicated to state in detail, a broad outline will
170. Consumers' interests, it is to be noted, are protected by the stated goals of
steady supplies at reasonable prices. The producer's interests are protected by the
establishment of a goal of a "fair standard of living for the agricultural community."
171. Council Regulation 26/62, art. 2(2), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
935B
(1962).
172. See F. SCHERER, supra note 139, at 41-130.
173. D. BAROUNOS, supra note 138, at 243.

174. Id.
175. See generally id. at 242-44.
176. See generally id. at 243-45.
177. See, e.g., FRUBO, infra note 183.
178. Cooperative Vereeniging "Suiker Unie" v. EEC Comm'n, [1975 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8334 (Ct. J. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Sugar
Cartel]. See also 363 EUROMARKur NEWS (CCH), Dec. 30, 1975, at 2.
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be sketched briefly.
Essentially, the main sugar producers in France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy attempted to separate
their national markets from each other, so as to allow each
group of national producers sole access to its own market. According to the Commission's findings, sales were allowed between markets only as accepted by producers in these markets."' On these facts, the Commission found various prohibited concerted practices.8 0 The Court of Justice annulled large
parts of the Commission's decision.'"' Again, the specific details regarding which of sixteen producers was liable on what
count is beyond the scope of this article. The relevant aspects
of the law discussed in the opinion, however, are set forth
below.
The overlap between the Community's agricultural policy
and its rules of competition was clearly demonstrated in that
portion of the opinion dealing with the organization of the
Community itself. The Court found that in agricultural matters, even where the market organization involved national production quotas, EEC antitrust rules were applicable so long as
there was room for private competition within the organization.'8 2 Yet, where private competition was largely restricted by
organization in the member state, anticompetitive practice by
private firms consequently could not significantly affect competition due to the very nature of the market concerned. In
such a case, Article 85(1) would not apply. In the present case
though, the Court reasoned with respect to sugar, that a significant residual field of competition existed, and that conduct
worsening conditions in it was not acceptable.
The Sugar Cartel cases extended and refined the analysis
of an earlier case, FRUBO v. EEC Commission,'13 regarding
179. European Sugar Cartel, Commission Decision of Jan. 2, 1973, [May, 1973]
J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 140) 17, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder, New Developments]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

9570 (1973).

180. Id. at 9282.
181. Sugar Cartel, supra note 178, at 8262.
182. Id. at 8150-52.
183. [1973-1975 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9673 (Ct. J. 1975) [hereinafter cited as FRUBO]. FRUBO concerned the organiza-

tion of a system for the sale of fresh fruit, which the Commission found in breach of
Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. Advocate-General Mayera correctly noted in the
Sugar Cartel cases that FRUBO represented the only other time the Court had
faced the difficulties of applying a rule of competition to an agricultural section covered by a Common Market organization. Sugar Cartel, supra note 178, at 8302.
The FRUBO Court cited Council Regulation 26/62, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
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situations where the competition and agricultural policies of

the EEC overlap. Rather than assuming the market to be simply bifurcated, the Sugar Cartel Court showed an awareness of
the necessity for a significant private market before Article
85(1) would apply, for otherwise, there could be by definition
no significant effect upon trade between member states."s4 The
Sugar Cartel Court also implied that a balancing mechanism
was called for where the private market was of less significance.
Where a market's significance is diminished, the rigorousness
of the standards applied to potentially noncompetitive behavior should be reduced." 5 While not constituting a per se rule in
any sense, this approach nonetheless provides some clarification in an area clouded by doctrinal overlap.
The Court of Justice, also discussing concerted practices,
concluded that parties must act independently in adapting
themselves to the practices of their competitors. Thus, direct
or indirect contact between competitors in order to influence a
firm's actions or to reveal one's own planned conduct is absolutely precluded.' This conclusion reaffirms the position
taken in earlier case law.8 7 There is still a need under this
"adaptation and influences" approach to examine all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the situation. The Sugar Cartel
cases stand for the proposition that while market conditions
may cause essentially parallel pricing and behavior, that result
must be arrived at independently by the individual firm to
avoid application of Article 85 .1M The Court's view that a concerted practice only involves action based on contact between
935 (1962), which implements Article 42 of the EEC Treaty, Treaty of Rome, done
March 25, 1957, art. 42, 298 U.N.T.S. 32, as controlling. FRUBO, supra, at 9497-4.
Article 1 of Regulation 26 states that Articles 85 through 90 of the EEC Treaty are
applicable to production of or trade in agricultural products. Article 2(1) of Regulation
26/62, however, qualifies Article 1, providing that "Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not
apply to such of the agreements, decisions and practices referred to in the preceding
Article as form an integral part of a national market organization or are necessary for
attainment of the objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty." Council Regulation
26/62, supra, at 935B. The FRUBO Court held that the subject agreement, while
stabilizing the market, did not meet the requirements for exemption to Article 85(1)
under Article 2(1) of Regulation 26/62. In the Court's view, the agreements failed either
to increase agricultural productivity, or to insure a fair standard of living for the
agricultural community. FRUBO, supra, at 9497-5.
184. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
185. Id.
186. Sugar Cartel, supra note 178, at 8179.
187. See, e.g., Dyestuffs cases, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH)
8161-8169 (Ct. J. 1972).
188. Sugar Cartel, supra note 178, at 8179.
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the parties rather than the carrying out of a deliberate plan is
sound; the latter view, urged by the companies in the instant
case, is close to a definition of an agreement rather than a
practice. The standard established here for applying Article 85
is more realistic in light of business practices than would be the
less easily applied test advocated by the companies.
Conclusion
As noted at the outset, Article 85 represents one of the
cornerstones of a system designed to foster free competition.
However, its sweeping prohibition against restrictive trade
practices is clearly tempered by judicial interpretation when
the-facts of a specific case so demand. This seems a desirable
goal, for in an area that fluctuates as rapidly as economic markets, any hard and fast rules would quickly prove unworkable.
If the provisions of Article 85 were the sole guarantors of competition in the Common Market, there would still be many
avenues through which undertakings could distort the free flow
of goods. The provisions of Article 86 are designed to fill this
void.
ARTICLE

86:

ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION

According to Article 86: "[a]ny abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States."'' 9 Thus, the following four conditions must be satisfied for this Article to apply:
1. One or more undertakings must have a dominant position.1,0
2. The dominant position must be held within the Common Market or a substantial part of it.
3. There must be an abuse of that dominant position.
4. The abuse must be capable of affecting trade between
member states.
Dominant Position
Neither Article 86 nor Regulation 17 gives a definition of
189. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49.
190. Article 86 applies to one or more undertakings which abuse a dominant
position; thus, it probably also applies to oligopolies.
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the term, "dominant position," but the Commission, in the
Continental Can case has emphasized "overall independence of
behavior": "I
Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have
the power to behave independently, which puts them in a
position to act without taking into account their competitors, purchasers or suppliers. That is the position when,
because of their share of the market, or of their share of the
market combined with the availability of technical knowledge, raw materials or capital, they have the power to determine prices or to control production or distribution for
a significant part of the products in question. This power
does not necessarily have to derive from an absolute domination permitting the undertakings which hold it to eliminate the decisionmaking power of their partners. It is sufficient that they be strong enough as a whole to ensure to
those undertakings an overall independence of behavior,
even if there are differences in intensity in their influences
on the different partial markets."2
Thus, to have a dominant position, an undertaking must: 1. be
able to have a significant influence on the market; 2. have the
power to behave independently; and 3. understand its position
and its ability to influence the market.
It should be noted that the mere existence of a dominant
position does not infringe Article 86; only abuses of a dominant
position are prohibited.
Additionally, the phrase "within the common market or a
substantial part of it," is not defined in either the Treaty or
Regulation 17. However, the Commission has concluded that
Germany constitutes a "substantial part" of the Common
Market. 9 ' Similarly, the Commission has indicated that
Benelux and north and central Germany fulfill this requirement. Thus, France, Germany, Benelux, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and possibly Denmark and Ireland, are substantial
parts of the Common Market.
191.

Continental Can, Commission Decision of Dec. 9, 1971, [Jan., 1972] J.O.

COMM. EUR. (No. L 7) 25, [1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH)
9481 [hereinafter cited as Continental Can Commission Decision].
192. Id. at 9029 (translation from COMM. MKT. L.R.).

193. Continental Can Commission Decision, supra note 191, at 9032; Gema,
Commission Decision of June 2, 1971, [June, 19711 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 134) 15,
[1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9438
[hereinafter cited as Gemal.
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Abuse
Article 86(a)-(d) provides the following examples of the
types of "abuse" which are prohibited:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at
a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. "'
Major Pre-1974 Article 86 Decisions
The two major pre-1974 cases under Article 86 are the
Commission Decision, Gema 95 and the Court of Justice decision, Continental Can.' In the Gema decision, the Commission found that the following activities by Gema, the organization which manages the rights of authors and composers of
musical works in Germany, were abusive:
1. discriminating against nationals of other member
states,
2. binding members by unnecessary obligations,
3. preventing, through its system, the establishment of a
single market in the supply of services of music publishers,
4. extending copyright, through contractual means, to
non-copyright works,
5. discriminating against independent importers of
phonograph records as compared with manufacturers of records,
6. discriminating against importers of tape recorders and
optical sound recorders as compared with the German manufacturers of such equipment.'97
This decision is significant in that the Commission employed a broad definition of abuse. It is clear that the Commission considered the list of possible abuses in Article 86, not
194.
195.
196.
197.

Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 86(a)-(d), 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49.
Gema, supra note 193.
Continental Can, supra note 54.
Gema, supra note 193, at 8951-58.
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exhaustive, but merely exemplary.
In the Continental Can case, the Court of Justice further
expanded the definition of abuse: "Thus, abusive conduct
could be present where an enterprise in a dominant position
strengthens that position to the point where the degree of domination achieved substantially hampers competition, so that
only enterprises which in their market conduct are dependent
on the dominant enterprise would remain on the market."' 98
In essence, the Court concluded that a merger could be a
method of so strengthening a dominant position and, therefore,
an abuse. This decision was based on the purposes and policy
embodied in Article 3(f)'" and the substantive provisions of
Articles 85 and 86. The Court held that the principle of Article
3(f) indicates that Article 86 is intended to be broad enough
to prevent enterprises from accomplishing through merger
what they could not achieve by way of agreement because of
Article 85.
Thus, abuse must be defined by reference, on the one
hand, to the list of examples in Article 86 and by reference, on
the other hand, to the general principles of harmonious economic development and undistorted competition contained in
Articles 2200 and 3(f).20'
Major Post-1974 Article 86 Decisions
From 1974 through 1976, the Court of Justice decided two
cases under Article 86;102 two cases in which both Articles 86
198. Continental Can, supra note 54, at 8300.
199. Article 3(f) reads as follows: "For the purpose set out in Art. 2, the activities
of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with
the timetable set out therein: . . .(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted." Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957,
art. 3(f), 298 U.N.T.S. 16.
200. Article 2 reads as follows:
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common
Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and
closer relations between its Member States.
Id. art. 2, at 15.
201. In group regulation cases, the Court generally concludes that the introduction of a system of undistorted competition is essential to the establishment of a
common market.
202. General Motors Continental N.V.v. EEC Comm'n, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. RFP. (CCH) 8320 (Ct. J. 1975) [hereinafter cited as General Motors];
Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.A. & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. EEC Comm'n,
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and 90 were in issue;0 3 one case under Articles 85 and 86;2°4 and
one case which dealt with Articles 85, 86, 90, and others. °5
Commercial Solvents case.20 This case involved a refusal
to sell by the sole manufacturer of a precursor of certain pharmaceutical substances. Commercial Solvents Corporation
(CSC), a Maryland corporation, manufactured and sold products based on nitroparaffines, including 1-nitropropane and its
derivative 2-amino-l-butanol. Both these chemicals are used in
the manufacture of ethambutol and ethambutol-based substances which are used in the treatment of tuberculosis. In
1962, CSC acquired a controlling interest in the Istituto Chemioterapico Italinano S.A. (Istituto), an Italian company, which
resold the aminobutanol manufactured in the United States by
CSC.
Beginning in 1966, Laboratorio Chemico Farmaceutico
Giorgio Zoja, SpA (Zoja) purchased aminobutanol from Istituto. However, after Istituto had begun the development of its
own ethambutol-based products in 1968, CSC decided that it
would stop selling the basic precursors of ethambutol, nitropropane and aminobutanol, to purchasers in the Common Market.
Instead, it decided to supply dextroaminobutanol, an upgraded
intermediary between these precursors and ethambutol-based
products, to Istituto which would convert this chemical to
ethambutol for sale in the Common Market and for its own use.
After extended negotiations with Istituto and after searching the world market, Zoja found that aminobutanol was available only from CSC. CSC, however, refused to sell aminobutanol to Zoja. Therefore, on April 8, 1971, Zoja requested that
the Commission institute proceedings.
After the normal procedural prerequisites, the Commission, on December 14, 1972, issued a decision requiring Istituto
and CSC:
8209 (Ct. J. 1975) [hereinafter
[1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
cited as Commercial Solvents].
203. Ex parte Sacchi, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8267
(Ct. J. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Ex parte Sacchi]; Belgische Radio en Televise v.
8268 (Ct. J. 1974)
SABAM, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)

[hereinafter cited as SABAM].
204. Sugar Cartel, supra note 178; EMI, supra note 40.
205. Industria Gomma Articoli Vari v. Ente Nazionale per la Cellulosa e per la
8311 (Ct. J. 1975)
Carta, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
[hereinafter cited as IGAV]. One other case, discussed at text accompanying notes
74-84 supra, also dealt with Article 86 in conjunction with Article 85. It is not discussed
here because of its very limited significance.
206. Commercial Solvents, supra note 202.
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(a) Under penalty of a fine of 1000 units of account per
day of delay, beginning 31 days after receipt of the decision, to supply 60,000 kilograms of nitropropane or 30,000
kilograms of aminobutanol to Zoja, at its most urgent
needs, at a price not exceeding the maximum price
charged for those two products;
(b) under penalty of a second fine of 1000 units of account per day, to submit to the Commission within two
months after receipt of the decision, proposals for the subsequent supply of Zoja;
(c) to pay a fine of 200,000 units of account." 7
On February 16, 1973, Istituto and CSC applied to the
Court for the annulment of this decision.
At the outset, the Court of Justice was forced to consider
whether CSC held a dominant position. The Court found that
it was not disputed that the world's leading manufacturers of
ethambutol used raw material produced by CSC. Similarly,
the Court found that the production and sale of ethambutol by
other manufacturers was of minor importance in comparison to
that of these major producers. Based on this evidence, the
Court concluded that CSC had a dominant position in the
world market for the precursors of ethambutol.
On the relevant product market question, the Court found,
contrary to CSC's and Istituto's arguments, that the market for
the manufacture of a product could be distinguished from the
market on which the product is sold.
An abuse of a dominant position on the market in raw
materials may thus have effects restricting competition in
the market on which the derivatives of the raw materials
are sold, and these effects must be taken into account in
considering the effects of an infringement, even if the market for the derivatives does not constitute a self-contained
market.20
The Court also found that CSC's and Istituto's refusal to
supply Zoja, with the object of reserving the raw materials for
themselves, risked eliminating competition from Zoja. Such
conduct was contrary to the principles expressed in Article 3(f)
and in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. Therefore, such refusal was an abuse of a dominant position.
In discussing the effect of CSC's abuse on trade between
207. Id. at 8803.
208. Id. at 8819.
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member states, the Court of Justice observed that Article 3(f)
and Article 2 must be taken into consideration in the interpretation and application of Articles 85 and 86. Article 3(f) provides that the activities of the Community shall include the
institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted, 00° while Article 2 charges the
Community with the task of promoting "throughout the Com' 210
munity harmonious development of economic activities.
Article 86, therefore, applies to abuses which directly affect
consumers, as well as to abuses which indirectly affect them by
impairing an effective competitive structure.
The result is that the Community authorities must take
into consideration all the consequences of illegal abuses for the
Common Market's competitive system without distinguishing
between production intended for intra-market sale and that
intended for export.
When an undertaking in a dominant position within the
Common Market abusively exploits its position in such a
way that a competitor in the Common Market is likely to
be eliminated, it does not matter whether the conduct relates to the latter's exports or its trade within the Common
Market, once it has been established that this elimination
will have repercussions on the competitive structure within
21
the Common Market. '

The Court of Justice held that CSC and Istituto should be
treated as a single economic unit and that they should be held
jointly and severally liable.2 11 It based this decision on the fact
that CSC not only had, but also exercised, the ability to control
Istituto's policy, and on the fact that the firms acted for their
common benefit.
Finally, in reference to liability, they affirmed the Commission's decision, which ordered CSC and Istituto to begin
supplying Zoja with specified quantities of the raw material.
The defendants argued that both the order to supply and the
specification of an amount exceeded the Commission's remedial powers. The Court made short work of these contentions
noting that a Commission decision requiring termination of an
infringement "may include an order to do certain acts or pro209.
210.

See note 199 and accompanying text supra.
See note 200 and accompanying text supra.

211.
212.

Commercial Solvents, supra note 202, at 8821.
Id. at 8821-22.
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vide certain advantages which have been wrongfully withheld.""'
The Commercial Solvents case establishes that a dominant firm's refusal to deal which is likely to eliminate competition is an abuse under Article 86. It also reaffirms the position
that the list of abuses set out in Article 86 is not exhaustive.
More importantly, however, the Court of Justice seems to have
promulgated a per se rule and to have reiterated that Article
3(f) must be taken into consideration in the interpretation of
Article 86.24 The formulation of a per se rule provides a measure of guidance in a legal area where businessmen have often
complained of the difficulty of dealing with market uncertainty." 5
The Court did not come to grips, however, with the policy
questions involved in a refusal to deal situation. After all, what
is the actual problem that results from a corporation refusing
to supply another enterprise-entity with necessary goods? Presumably, it is that the bankruptcy of the second corporation
will somehow lessen competition in the given market. Yet, that
is nowhere examined in the opinion of the Court, which makes
the unwarranted assumption regarding an oligopoly that another firm in the market will necessarily enhance competition
and lower prices. Neither the acquisition of a supplier or customer by a dominant firm (vertical integration), nor the driving out of business of a supplier or customer, will necessarily
have a deleterious impact on prices."1 6 The per se rule adopted
by the Court unfortunately seems to preclude an investigation
into individual market conditions, which might reveal whether
the loss of a supplier or customer would affect prices, without
any apparent reason.
The Court extended the enterprise-entity doctrine since
the relationship between CSC and Istituto was not as close as
that between parents and subsidiaries to which the enterpriseentity doctrine had been applied in previous cases. The judgment also affirmed that the Community's antitrust law has an
extraterritorial effect.2 1 1 Thus, a non-EEC company which con213. Id. supra note 202, at 8822.
214. See notes 199 & 200 and accompanying text supra.
215. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
216. Korah, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.P.A. and Commercial Solvents
Corporation v. Commission of the European Communities, 11 COMM. MKT. L. REV.
248, 261-62 (1974).
217. See ICI, supra note 16; Continental Can, supra note 54.
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trols a subsidiary in the Community is subject to the jurisdiction of Community institutions.
The scope of Article 86 recently has likewise been expanded by the reasoning of Commercial Solvents. According to
the Court, Article 86 prohibits an abuse by a dominant undertaking if that abuse is likely to affect the competitive structure
of the Common Market. Apparently, this is true even if the
abuse does not relate to exports and imports between member
states, but only to exports outside the Community. This interpretation of the phrase in Article 86, "affect trade between
member states," is similar to that given to the same phrase in
Article 85.218 In addition, this holding follows from the judgment in Continental Can that Articles 2 and 3(f) should be
taken into consideration in the interpretation of Article 86.
Finally, the Court of Justice strengthened the power of the
Commission by approving its order that CSC and Istituto supply Zoja with the immediately needed raw materials and submit proposals regarding its subsequent supply. As a result of
this judicial approval, the Commission can require positive
action, as well as the termination of infringements, by undertakings.
General Motors Continental N. V. v. EEC Commission."9
The parameters of Article 86 were further defined by the Court
in this case. The Belgian government required that all motor
vehicles used in Belgium meet certain technical requirements.
Manufacturers or authorized Belgian agents of foreign manufacturers were required to inspect all vehicles assembled in
Belgium and all vehicles imported into Belgium which are less
than six months old and to issue certificates which confirm
that such vehicles conform to such technical requirements.
General Motors Continental N.V. (GMC), a subsidiary of General Motors for the Benelux countries, was the sole authorized
inspecting agent for General Motors and its subsidiaries.
The certificates of conformity were issued by GMC for
vehicles sold through its approved dealers. As sole authorized
agent, it also issued certificates for General Motors vehicles
which were new or had been registered outside of Belgium for
less than six months, and which were imported by individuals
or non-approved dealers (parallel imports) rather than through
218.
219.

See text accompanying notes 61-64, 131-132 supra.
General Motors, supra note 202.
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the standard General Motors system. No charge was made for
the inspection of vehicles assembled in Belgium or imported by
approved dealers.
Between March 15 and July 31, 1973, in five cases, GMC
charged the same rate for the inspection of and issuance of
documents for parallel imports of European manufacture as it
charged for such inspection of General Motors vehicles manufactured in and imported from the United States; however, the
actual cost of inspection of the European vehicles was less than
that of the American vehicles.
Beginning August 1, 1973, a new scale of charges was implemented which distinguished between vehicles of European
and American manufacture. At approximately the same time,
GMC refunded part of the payment in the five cases where
owners of the European vehicles had been required to pay the
rate charged for vehicles manufactured in the United States.
Despite this refund, the Commission instituted an inquiry
after it became aware of the facts. After fulfilling the procedural requirements of Regulation 17, the Commission adopted
a decision on December 19, 1974, which found that:
between March 15 and July 31, 1973, General Motors Continental N.V. intentionally infringed Article 86 by charging a price that was abusive for the issue of certificates [of
conformity] . . . which it was required to issue under

Belgian law after inspecting Opel vehicles to check their
conformity with the general approved type and after determining identification of the vehicles."'
The Commission, therefore, imposed a fine on GMC of
100,000 units of account. GMC brought proceedings before the
Court of Justice on March 7, 1975, praying that the Court
annul the decision or discharge GMC from payment of the fine.
On the issue of dominant position, GMC argued that issuance of certificates of conformity was merely ancillary to its
sale of motor vehicles and that the relevant product market
was the motor vehicle industry in which it did not have a domi-

nant position. The Court, however, found that the Belgian government had granted GMC a legal monopoly to issue certificates of conformity and that GMC had power to fix any price
for this service. Thus, GMC had a dominant position within
the meaning of Article 86 since, for any given make, the ap220. Id. at 7728.
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proval procedure could be carried out in Belgium only by the
manufacturer or officially appointed authorized agent under
conditions fixed unilaterally by that party.
In the course of deciding whether GMC had abused its
dominant position, the Court theorized that GMC could possibly do so by setting a price for its conformity service "which is
to the detriment of any person acquiring a motor vehicle imported from another Member State and subject to the approval
procedure."22 The Court, however, observed that it must take
into account all of the factors that contributed to the Commission's decision in order to determine whether GMC had abused
its dominant position.
The Court indicated that GMC was only occassionally required to carry out an inspection of the type in question, that
such inspections were of minute importance in comparison to
the other inspections conducted by GMC, and that GMC simply charged for this relatively unusual activity the price "which
22
was until then normal for the vehicles it imported."
The Court also observed that after complaints by the parties concerned, and before action by the Commission, GMC
reduced the charge for inspection of vehicles of European manufacture to a level that was related to the inspection cost and
refunded the excess over the new inspection price to the parties
concerned.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the Court concluded that
GMC's conduct did not amount to an abuse of a dominant
position under Article 86.
General Motors Continental indicates that Belgium is a
"substantial part" of the Common Market. Thus, it is probable
that any member state is a substantial part of the Common
Market under Article 86.23 The case also affirms that a dominant position can result from the grant of an exclusive right by
the government of a member state.
The Court's conclusion that GMC's conduct was not an
abuse presents grounds for some speculation. Although the
Court discussed the facts and observed that they indicate an
absence of abuse, it did not explain the basis of such a conclusion."24
221. Id. at 7735.
222. Id.
223. See Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48.
224. General Motors, supra note 202, at 7735.
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In its submissions, GMC argued that the purpose of both
Articles 85 and 86 was to maintain effective competition within
the Community2 5 and that there can be no abuse of a dominant
position if neither the object nor the effect of the conduct in
question is to affect competition adversely. GMC further contended that "where . . . conduct corresponds to one of the

examples given in the second paragraph [of Article 86], it only
gives rise at the most to a rebuttable presumption of an
abuse,""22 and that, Article 86 therefore could not be automatically applied because of such correspondence.
The Commission responded" 7 and the Advocate-General
agreed 2 that Article 86 imposed no additional requirement
that conduct have the object or effect of adversely affecting
competition; rather, an abuse, by definition, has an adverse
effect on competition. Therefore, it was only necessary to determine whether the actions of an undertaking were abusive.
Since GMC's activities fell within Article 86(2)(b), the Commission and Advocate-General concluded there was an abuse.
It is possible that the Court accepted the Commission's
and the Advocate-General's legal reasoning that an abuse by
its very nature has an adverse effect on competition, but rejected their factual determination that GMC imposed unfair
prices. This interpretation is supported by the Court's holding
that GMC's conduct was not an abuse, instead of holding that
such conduct did not adversely affect competition.
It is also possible that the Court partially followed GMC's
arguments by finding that Articles 85 and 86 were designed to
prevent the distortion of or adverse effects on competition, and
that, therefore, conduct cannot be abusive within Article 86
unless it distorts or adversely affects competition. In paragraph
nine of the judgment the Court stated: "Such an abuse might
consist

. . .

in the imposition of a price which is excessive in

relation to the economic value of the service provided, and
which has the effect of curbing parallel imports .

... "229 One

might possibly interpret this passage to mean that a price is an
abuse if it is unfair ("excessive") and if it has an adverse effect
on competition ("effect of curbing"). Such an interpretation
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 7731.
at 7732.
at 7740.
at 7735 (emphasis added).
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would suggest the Court's partial agreement with GMC's contention.
Finally, it is possible that the Court was relying on an
alternative approach in interpreting GMC's conduct. Article 86
requires that the prohibited conduct affect trade between
member states. One commentator has suggested that this
translates into a requirement that the abuse, to be prohibited,
must adversely affect trade between member states:
[I]t is not just the fact that a particular type of abuse of
a monopolistic or oligopolistic position has an impact on a
substantial part of the trade between the member States
of the Community that would seem to matter so much (as
indeed the provisions of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty on
their face would seem to suggest). It is rather more important that some effect on trade, however infinitesimal or
minimal, has occurred or is likely to occur, which in principle might be deemed on the balance of probabilities to
militate against competition in business or in trade. 3 "
If the Court of Justice was following this line of reasoning,
it may have determined that GMC's conduct was an abuse, but
that it did not adversely affect trade between member states.
The Sugar Cartel cases. Abuse of dominant position under
Article 86 was also an issue in the Sugar Cartel cases 3 ' discussed previously in connection with Article 85. In these cases,
the Court of Justice employed a definition of "substantial part
of the common market" even more liberal than the single member state view adopted in General Motors Continental. In examining the relevant geographical market, the Court looked to
various economic factors on both the production and consumption sides, and found that the southern part of Germany met
the meaning of Article 86's required "substantial part of the
' ' 23
common market. 2
This marked a significant departure from the Court's early
decisions which required several countries combined, or at
2 33
least one member state to satisfy the substantial part test.
Here, the test was satisfied by a portion of one member state.23 4
This suggests that market conditions, such as the proportion
230.

Bentil, Control of the Abuse of Monopoly Power in EEC Business Law, 12

COMM. MKT. L. REV. 59, 73 (1975).

231.
232.
233.
234.

Sugar Cartel, supra note 178.
See text accompanying notes 193 & 194 supra.
See text accompanying notes 191-194 supra.
Sugar Cartel, supra note 178.
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of use in the given area of a product relative to the whole
Community's use, will be given precedence in determining the
applicability of Article 86 over strict concerns for the number
of national areas involved.
In examining the possibility of an abuse of a dominant
position, the question of agency also figured prominently in the
Sugar Cartel decisions. Agents operating solely for one principal are to be regarded as quasi-employees of the principal and
therefore not subject to Article 86. Yet, if the agent is contractually allowed to work for others in a similar capacity, and if
the principal later contracts to prohibit the agent's dealing in
competing goods, this may be an abuse of a dominant position
if it is likely to help further such dominance. If a dominant firm
also largely controls distribution of the product and foreign
competitors can find no uncontrolled outlets for distribution
and must seek those of the dominant firm, an abuse of dominant position may be found." 5
The EMI cases. 3 ' Article 86 was also touched on briefly in
the EMI cases, where the Court of Justice also found that the
ownership of a trademark right did not per se constitute a
dominant position under Article 86. This position accords with
prior case law."3 7 Generally, a dominant position will only be
found if, in addition to an industrial property right, another
basis for exclusion of competition exists.
Previous cases also established that the exploitation of a
235. See id. at 8233. This view of agency is not very satisfactory despite its
reaffirmance in the Sugar Cartel decision. Article 85(1) does not apply to contracts of
principals with exclusive agents, because the Commission believes they do not restrict
competition since they only act as quasi-employees for their principals. Where an agent
acts as an independent trader on its own account, it is not protected under Article
85(1). The benchmark apparently used to determine whether one is an exclusive agent
or an independent trader is based upon the incidence of risk borne by the agent.
Barounos, Hall, and James are extremely critical of the Commission's position,
insisting (correctly in our view) that a limitation of supply can result where agents are
obliged to handle only one principal's goods, to the exclusion of others. This restriction
of competition may be justified by a special relationship between the principal and
agent, but that does not mean, as the Commission maintains, that there is no restriction of competition. This astute commentary goes on to point out that exclusion from
Article 85 could have been better managed by not considering the principal-agent
arrangement to be equivalent to an agreement between undertakings. They would
thereby not meet on one of the primary conditions necessary for the application of
Article 85. To the degree that the Sugar Cartel Court accepted the Commission's
position, which it did in large part, it missed the opportunity to put this question in
better perspective. See D. BAROUNOS, supra note 138.
236. EMI, supra note 40.
237. See Deutsche Grammophon, supra note 30; Sirena, supra note 30; Parke,
Davis, supra note 30.
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trademark in order to prevent importation of goods bearing the
same mark did not constitute abuse of a dominant position.238
The instant case affirms these decisions. However, it leaves
open the question of whether an exceptional power to abuse,
conferred by an industrial property right, is sufficient to trigger
Article 86's application.
Conclusion
Along with Article 85, the provisions of Article 86 form the
cornerstones designed to guarantee free competition within the
Common Market. Particularly, Article 86 attacks those undertakings which seek to restrict or distort competition by exercising undue control over the free flow of goods. Again, as with
Article 85, the strength of the Article 86 sanctions depends
largely on the interpretation given its provisions by both the
Commission and the Court of Justice. Certain Treaty provisions limit the undertakings directly subject to the language of
Articles 85 and 86. An examination of Article 90 provides a look
at the circumstances under which the competitive rules will
apply to these undertakings.
ARTICLE

90: SPECIAL UNDERTAKINGS

Article 905 contains rules for the application of the
Treaty, particularly the competitive provisions, to public undertakings and undertakings to which member states grant
special or exclusive rights. Article 90(1) prohibits member
states from enacting measures in favor of public or special un238. See Deutsche Grammophon, supra note 30; Sirena, supra note 30.
239. Article 90 reads as follows:
1. Member States shall in respect of public enterprises and enterprises
to which they grant special or exclusive rights, neither enact nor maintain
in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in
particular, to those rules provided for in Article 7 and in Articles 85 to
94 inclusive.
2. Any enterprise charged with the management of services of general
economic interest or having the character of a fiscal monopoly shall be
subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those governing competition, to the extent that the application of such rules does
not obstruct the de jure or de facto fulfilment of the specific tasks en-

trusted to such enterprise. The development of trade may not be affected
to such a degree as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this
Article and shall, where necessary, issue appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.
Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 90, 298 U.N.T.S. 50.
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dertakings which violate the Treaty. Article 90(2) supplies an
important exception to this principle: "Undertakings entrusted
with the operation of services of general economic interest or
having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly" are
only subject to the provisions of the Treaty to the extent that
"the application of such rules does not obstruct the performances in law or in fact of the particular tasks assigned to them."
This exception, in turn, is tempered by another requiring that
the disregard of the Treaty permitted by Article 90(2) must not
affect "the development of trade . . . to such an extent as
would be contrary to the interests of the Community." In the
years 1974 through 1977, the Court of Justice decided three
important cases involving Article 90: Belgische Radio en Televise v. SABAM; Ex parte Sacchi; and Industria Gomma Articoli Vari v. Ente Nazionale per la Cellulosa e per la Carta.
The SABAM case.'4 This decision concerned the application of Articles 86 and 90 to the Belgian Association of Authors,
Composers and Publishers (SABAM), a co-operative organization, governed by Belgian law, which is charged with the exploitation, administration, and management of all copyrights
and related rights, on its behalf, for its members and associates, and for its clients and affiliated undertakings.
In 1963 and 1967 respectively, SABAM entered into its
standard form contracts with Davis, a composer, and Rosenstraten, a songwriter. Pursuant to these contracts, Davis and
Rosenstraten assigned to SABAM their copyrights in all present and future compositions of which they were or would be
owners, and all present of future rights on performances and
productions of phonograph records. The contracts gave
SABAM the authority to retain and to exercise the assigned
rights for five years after a member's withdrawal from the association.
On March 11, 1969, the Belgische Radio en Televise
(BRT) entered into an agreement with Davis and Rosenstraten
pursuant to which BRT was assigned certain copyrights for the
words and music of a song, "Sperciebonen." This contract included provisions which required that the assignment to BRT
be exclusive for two years and, if the agreement was incompatible with other contracts concluded by the authors, that the
authors procure from the other party to the incompatible contract a declaration permitting the agreement with BRT.
"Sperciebonen" was repeatedly broadcast on radio and televi240.

SABAM, supra note 203.
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sion. SABAM entrusted the Bureau International d'Edition
Mecanique (BIEM) with the responsibility of managing the
SABAM repertoire and of granting permission for the production of recordings.
The Belgian company NV Fonior which had a contractual,
nonexclusive right to record works in the BIEM repertoire produced and sold a recording of "Sperciebonen." In March and
April, 1969, both BRT and SABAM tried to prevent Fonior
from producing this record, however, Fonior continued its manufacture and distribution. BRT and SABAM, therefore,
brought an action before the Tribunal de Premiere Instance of
Brussels praying that Fonior be condemned for the alleged illegal reproduction.2"4' The dispute centered around the ownership
of the copyrights. Both SABAM and BRT claimed title to the
rights and thus the right to prohibit Fonior's reproduction.
On June 3, 1970, the Commission, on its own initiative,
began proceedings pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 17 in
regard to SABAM and similar organizations in France and
Germany. SABAM was notified by a letter of June 8, 1970 of
the Commission's objections. It particularly objected to clauses
in the form copyright assignment contracts dealing with the
global assignment of copyrights and the length of time the
assignment continued after the resignation of a member. These
proceedings were still in progress at the time of the SABAM
judgment.
On April 4, 1973, the Brussels court referred the following
questions to the European Court of Justice:"'
1. Can the facts that an undertaking which enjoys a de
facto monopoly in a Member-State in the management of
copyrights requires the global assignment of all such rights
without making any distinction between specific categories be regarded as an abuse of a dominant position within
the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty?
2. Can the abuse of a dominant position also consist in
the fact that such an undertaking stipulates that an author
shall assign his present and future rights, and in particular
in the fact that, without having to give an account of its
241. Id. at 9185-16.
242. On December 12, 1973, the Court first heard the Advocate-General "on the
preliminary issue of whether it would accept remission of the questions or whether the
Belgian court, rather, should not have stayed its own proceedings until the Commis" The Court accepted the remission
sion had issued a decision in its proceedings ...
on January 30, 1974. The Court heard submissions of the Advocate-General again on
February 12, 1974, and gave its final judgment on March 27, 1974. Id.
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actions, that undertaking can continue to exercise the
rights assigned for five more years following the withdrawal of the member?
3. How should the expression "undertaking entrusted
with the operation of services of general economic interest"
be understood? Is it necessary that such an undertaking
should have specific privileges which are denied to other
undertakings?
4. Can the provisions of Article 90(2) of the Treaty create
rights for private parties which national courts must
safeguard?
In response to questions one and two, the Court of Justice
observed that the Brussels court had found that SABAM enjoyed a quasi-monopoly in Belgium and that it therefore, had
a dominant position in a substantial part of the Common Market. After noting that Article 86 requires that an abuse, inter
alia, directly or indirectly impose unfair trading conditions, the
Court found that it must examine whether SABAM, in its statutes or contracts, directly or indirectly imposed "unfair conditions on members or third parties in the exploitation of copyrights."
In the course of this examination, all the relevant interests
had to be considered to ensure a balance between the freedom
of authors, composers, and publishers to dispose of their works
and the effective management of their copyrights by an organization which in practice they must join.
It was also necessary to consider the fact that SABAM's
purpose was to protect the rights and interests of its members
vis-A-vis major exploiters of musical material. For the organization to achieve its objectives, the copyrights had to be assigned to such an extent that SABAM could operate on an
effective scale. Thus, it had to be determined whether the assignments required by the SABAM form contracts were greater
than those absolutely necessary for the attainment of the organization's goals.
Although the Court observed that the clauses in question
may be abuses under Article 86, it held that the relevant national court must decide whether, in fact, they were abuses,
taking into account both their effect when combined and their
effect when separate. Furthermore, if it were found that the
clauses were abusive, that court must determine the effect of
the clauses on the relevant members or third parties in order
to decide "the consequences for the validity and effect of the
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The
contracts in dispute or certain of their provisions."2 43
Court, thus concluded in answer to the first two questions that:

the fact that an undertaking entrusted with the exploitation of copyrights and occupying a dominant position
within the meaning of Article 86 imposes on its members
obligations which are not necessary for the attainment of
its purpose and which impair unreasonably a member's
freedom to exercise his copyright could constitute an
abuse.

4

In answering question three, the Court concluded that Article 90(2) must be strictly interpreted since it permits action
in derogation of the Treaty. The Court also found that private
entities could come within the provision if they were entrusted
with the "operation of services of general economic interest" by
2 45
government action.
The Court, therefore, ruled that Article 90(2) did not encompass SABAM since this association, which merely managed private intellectual property rights, had been given no
24
task or duty by Belgium. 1
Finally, the Court held that since Article 90(2) was not
applicable to SABAM, it was not necessary to answer the
to decide whether
fourth question, and therefore unnecessary
2 47
Article 90(2) was directly applicable.
In its Gema decision,2 48 the Commission determined that
an undertaking in a dominant position cannot impose unreasonable obligations and restrictions and that the measures
employed to achieve its goal must be the least restrictive possible. In SABAM, the Court basically affirmed this decision.
The operative concept in the Court's interpretation of Article 90(2)'s term "undertaking entrusted with the operation of
services of general economic interest" seems to be that the
undertaking must be assigned tasks by the state or public authorities. This interpretation expands upon the judgment in
Public Prosecutor of Luxembourg v. Muller-Hein2 41 in which
the Court found that Article 90(2) "could apply to an undertak243. Id. at 9185-37.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. Directly applicable Treaty provisions confer rights on individuals which
national courts must respect.
248. Gema, supra note 193.
249. [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8140 (Ct. J. 1971).
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ing that enjoys certain privileges so that it can carry out the
task given to it by law, 'maintaining for this purpose close contact with the public authorities.
...
250
In Muller-Hein, an undertaking entrusted with a task by
a statute was considered to possibly be within the ambit of
Article 90(2). In SABAM, the Court concluded that an undertaking could not be within 90(2) unless entrusted with a task
by a government.
Ex parte Sacchi.5 ' This Court of Justice decision further
defined the type of undertaking to which Article 90 applies and
served to clarify the relation of that Article to Article 86. Sacchi, the defendant in the original criminal proceedings, owned
and managed Telebiella, a firm which transmitted advertisements and programs of its own production by cable television,
and which maintained receivers for these transmissions in several public bars. He was prosecuted under an Italian law for
failure to pay a license fee for the privilege of using these television receivers.
In the proceedings before the Tribunals of Biella, Sacchi
argued that, since the fee was intended for the financing of the
state broadcasting company, RAI, which possessed only the
exclusive right to transmit television broadcasts over the air,
it could not be collected for receivers used only to pick up a
private company's cable transmissions. Sacchi further argued
that if the exclusive right of RAI extended to the field of cable
television, it would infringe various articles of the Treaty of
Rome dealing with the free movement of goods and freedom of
competition. In response to these arguments, the Tribunal, on
July 6, 1973, stayed the proceedings and referred, among others, the following questions to the Court of Justice:
3. Whether Article 86, taken together with Articles 2 and
3(f) and Article 90(1) of the Treaty, is to be interpreted to
mean that, regardless of the means employed, to establish
a dominant position in a substantial part of the Common
Market is illegal and prohibited when the undertaking
which does so eliminates all forms of competition in the
field in which it operates and over the whole territorial area
of the Member-State, even though it is entitled by law to
do so.
4. If the answer to question 3 is in the affirmative,
whether a limited company on which a Member-State has
250.
251.

Id. at 7606.
Ex parte Sacchi, supra note 203.
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conferred by law the exclusive right, over the entire territory of the State, to carry out television broadcasting of all
kinds including broadcasts transmitted by cable, and
those for commercial advertising purposes, hold [sic]
within that territory a dominant position which is incompatible with Article 86 and is prohibited because, to the
detriment of Community consumers who, in a wider sense,
can be also regarded as users in general, the exclusive right
before-mentioned entails:
(a) the elimination of all competition as far as it
involves: broadcasting of advertisements (whether treated
as a product in its own right or as an instrument for promoting trade); the release for transmission of films, documentaries and other television programs produced in the
Community;
(b) the imposition of monopoly prices on television
commercials (in the absence of any other competitor in the
market), leading to the abuse of a dominant position;
(c) the ability to restrict at will broadcasts advertisnot approved of by the authorized company,
products
ing
whether on political or commercial grounds;
(d) the possibility of preferential treatment for the
advertising broadcasts of industrial or trade groups, again
for reasons which are not strictly economic;
(e) the broadest discretionary power in the choice
and distribution for broadcasting of productions, such as
films, documentaries and other programs whose use may
wholly depend on the authorized company's decision.
5. If the answer to question 4 is in the affirmative,
whether individuals have a subjective right, enforceable in
the national courts, to have the exclusive right whose effects were described in 4, abolished."'
In response to question three, which regarded the permissibility of state-granted monopolies, the Court noted that Article
90(1) allows member states to grant special or exclusive rights
to undertakings.2 53 It also found that nothing in the Treaty
prohibited a member state from granting to a particular entity,
for reasons of public interest of a noneconomic nature, exclusive rights in the fields of radio and television broadcasting,
including, cable television. The Court further stated that, in
fulfilling their duties, these entities "remain subject to the prohibitions against discrimination and, to the extent that this
252.
253.

Id. at 9175-76.
Id. at 9185-3.
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performance comprises activities of an economic nature, "254
they are covered by Article 90. Thus, where member states
organize their television industries as "undertakings performing a service of general economic interest," Article 86's
"prohibitions apply, as regards their behavior
on the market,
by reason of Article 90(2), so long as it is not shown that these
prohibitions are incompatible with the performance of their
255
tasks.
As a result of interpreting Article 86 in conjunction with
Article 90, the Court of Justice concluded that a monopoly held
by an institution to which a member state grants exclusive
rights is not, as such, incompatible with Article 86, and that
an extension of this monopoly by the state is, therefore, also
acceptable under 86.56
Although the Court found that the conduct described in
question four was capable of amounting to an abuse within the
meaning of Article 86, it held that the existence of such an
abuse must be ascertained by the national court. 257 Finally, in
answer to question five, the Court observed that even in the
framework of Article 90, the prohibitions of Article 86 create
rights enforceable by individual citizens in national courts.258
Although the term "undertakings" is not defined in the
Treaty it has been interpreted broadly to include all recognized
types of economic entities, including individual proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, unincorporated associations,
statutory bodies, co-operative societies, public enterprises, and
state-owned corporations. In Sacchi, the Italian and German
governments argued that their television institutions were not
undertakings because they pursued informational and cultural
tasks in the public interest. 59 In rejecting this contention, the
Court affirmed the broad definition of undertaking discussed
above. Sacchi also provides an important example of the type
of entity to which Article 90 applies. Although there has been
a fair amount of commentary regarding the characteristics of
undertakings falling under Article 90,20 Sacchi is one of the
first judgments of the Court of Justice to consider this question.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

241 (1974).

Id.
Id. at 9185-4.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see note 247 supra.
Ex parte Sacchi, supra note 203, at 9185-3.
See, e.g., K. LIPSTEIN, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
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Also, the judgment confirmed that Articles 86 and 90 in
conjunction permit a monopoly resulting from exclusive rights
granted by a state. In the Continental Can case,"' the Court
had held that an abuse of a dominant position could consist of
a dominant firm's strengthening of its position to a point at
which potential competitors were no longer existent, since all
firms in the relevant market had become dependent on the
dominant firm. In Sacchi, however, the Court determined that
the strengthening of a monopoly, because of an extension of its
coverage by the state, was not incompatible with Article 86
even though this extension could bring cable television, the
business most able to compete with broadcast television, under
the control of the broadcast television monopoly. 2 Such an
extension, somewhat similar to that condemned in Continental
Can, apparently was permitted in Sacchi because the relevant
undertaking was covered by Article 90. The case also emphasizes that a monopoly, permitted by a joint interpretation of
Articles 86 and 90, is prohibited from abusing its dominant
position.
Certain provisions of the Treaty are "directly applicable."
Such provisions confer rights upon individuals which the national courts must respect. In de Geus v. Bosch, it was held
that Article 86 is directly applicable. The Sacchi judgment
extends this doctrine by holding that Article 86 is directly applicable even in the context of Article 90.
Industria Gomma Articoli Vari v. E.N.C.C.214 This case

provides additional insight into the Court's attitude on public
undertakings. In 1970 and 1971, Industria Gomma Articoli Vari
(IGAV) imported, principally from member states, paper products for processing. On May 17, 1974, the Ente Nazionale per
la Cellulose e per la Carta (ENCC) made a claim against IGAV
for payment of 23,334,538 lire which was a levy on these paper
products prescribed by Italian law. The funds collected by the
ENCC were used, among other things, for the subsidizing of
newsprint produced by Italian papermills. IGAV was willing to
pay ENCC a duty of 2,042,031 lire for paper products imported
from non-member countries; however, it disputed the remaining 21,287,507 lire claimed as a levy on imports from member
261.
262.
263.
264.

Continental Can, supra note 54.
Ex parte Sacchi, supra note 203, at 9185-4.
[1961-1966 Court Decisions] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
IGAV, supra note 205.

8003 (Ct. J. 1962).
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states, and secured a temporary injunction, in an Italian court,
to prevent the ENCC's collection of the disputed sum. After
IGAV requested that the injunction be given permanent effect,
the Italian court referred various questions to the Court of Justice, including the following question regarding Article 85 and
Article 86:
With regard [to the use of the funds collected by ENCC
described above], and bearing in mind that the E.N.C.C.
duty utlimately subsidizes the national production of
newsprint, does not the said duty conflict with the Community rules in that, since only the papermills in the country in question are entitled to benefit from the duty, they
are placed in the position of being able, to the exclusion of
Community competitors, to share among themselves almost the whole of the Italian newsprint market, thus creating an agreement which is contrary to Articles 85 and 86
2
of the Treaty? 1
The Court of Justice observed that the Treaty of Rome
contains, in addition to Articles 85 and 86, several provisions
dealing with impairments of normal competition resulting from
state action. Thus, it found that "the activities of an institution of a public nature even if autonomous, fall under [these]
provisions . . . and not under Articles 85 and 86, even if its
interventions take place in the public interest and are devoid
of commercial character. ' ' 266 The Court, therefore, ruled that
the activities described in the question put by the Italian court
did not fall under Articles 85 and 86.
The duty attacked by IGAV was essentially used to finance national aids. Although the Court found that the activities in question fell under Articles 90, 92, 93, 94, 101, 102,
and/or 37,27 and formally held that such activities did not come
under Articles 85 and 86, it can be persuasively argued that the
judgment stands for the proposition that Articles 85 and 86
cannot be applied to a levy used to finance national aids.
The discussion of Article 90 completes the examination of
recent decisions of the European Court of Justice relating to
the key substantive antitrust provisions embodied in the
265. Id. at 7620.
266. Id. at 7628.
267. Id. In regard to Articles 90 through 94, see text accompanying notes 10-12
supra. Article 37 pertains to state commercial monopolies. Articles 101 and 102 relate
to approximation of laws. Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, arts. 37, 101-102, 298
U.N.T.S. 29, 54.
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Treaty of Rome. To fully comprehend how the rules prohibiting
unfair competition are implemented, it is necessary to take a
brief look at the procedural provisions of the Treaty.
TREATY OF ROME: PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK

Article 87(1)8 confers on the Council of Ministers of the

European Communities authority to institute regulations or
directives implementing Articles 85 and 86. Similarly, the
Commission is granted authority by Article 8921 to ensure application of the Community cartel and monopoly rules. The
Commission may investigate cases of suspected infringement
and make recommendations. If the recommendations are not
followed, it must prepare a decision indicating the existence of
the violation and may authorize enforcement measures.
Regulation 17,270 issued pursuant to Article 87, implements
Articles 85 and 86 and sets out the procedure to be followed by
the Commission when enforcing them. The Regulation provides the Commission with three procedures: negative clear3
ance, " ' notification,27 and termination of infringement.2
Negative Clearance
Pursuant to the negative clearance procedure, parties can
obtain from the Commission a declaration that an agreement,
decision, or practice does not fall within Article 85 or Article
86. Under Article 2 of Regulation 17,2" upon application of
firms, the Commission can certify that, on the basis of the facts
known to it, it has no ground for invoking Article 85(1) or
Article 86.2
Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 87(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 49.
Id. art. 89, at 49-50.
2401-2634 (1962).
Council Regulation 17, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
2411.
Id. art. 2,
Id. art. 4, 2431.
Id. art. 3, 2421.
Council Regulation 17, art. 2 reads as follows:
Upon application by the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned, the Commission may certify that, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, there are no grounds under Article 85(1) or Article 86 of
the Treaty for action on its part in respect of an agreement, decision or
practice.
Id. art. 2, 2411.
275. If the application is successful, the Commission will issue a declaration
stating that there are no grounds for it to intervene with respect to an agreement,
decision or practice. Id. 2412, at 1715.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
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An application for negative clearance is not followed by an
investigation. Instead, the Commission makes a decision on the
basis of the facts presented by the parties. Technically, domestic courts are not bound by a negative clearance decision. Furthermore, such a decision may be revised if the Commission
hears of new facts or information, or even if there is a change
in the judicial interpretation of the law.2"'
Notification
Notification is the procedure which an undertaking must
follow to obtain a exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty.
Article 4(1) of Regulation 17 states:
Agreements, decisions, and concerted practices of the kind
described in Article 85(1) of the Treaty which come into
existence after the entry into force of this Regulation and
in respect of which the parties seek application of Article
85(3) must be notified to the Commission. Until they have
been notified, no decision in application of Article 85(3)
may be taken." 7
Notified agreements are exempt from fines until the Commission issues a decision."8
Certain agreements do not have to be notified in order to
obtain an 85(3) exemption."' Furthermore, certain classes of
agreements under Article 85(3) benefit from bloc exemptions
under Article 85(3).s° Such agreements do not have to be noti281
fied.
Article 85(3) exemptions may only be granted for a specific
period, and may be subject to conditions and obligations.2 82
The Commission may amend or revoke the exemption decision
if: (a) the fundamental factual situation has changed; (b) the
parties have breached any obligation attached to the decision;
(c) the decision is based on incorrect information or was induced by deceit; or (d) there has been an abuse of the exemp283
tion.
276.
277.

278.
279.
280.
281.
Transfer
282.
283.

[Aug., 1962] J.O. COMM. EUR. 2137.
Council Regulation 17, art. 4(1), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 2431 (1971).

Id. art. 15(5), 2541.
Id. art. 4(2), 2431.
See Commission Regulation 67/67, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727 (1972).
See, e.g., Cadillon v. Firma Hoss Maschinenbau, 17 Recuei 351, [1971-1973
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8135.
Council Regulation 17, art. 8, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2471 (1962).
Id.
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Termination of Infringement
Upon its own initiative or upon the request of member
states or natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest, the Commission may investigate possible infringements of
Articles 85 and 86.284 If an infringement is found, the Commission may make a binding legal decision pursuant to Article
3(1).s58 Such a decision will also be issued as a result of a refusal
of a negative clearance or a refusal of an exemption under
Article 85(3), if the agreement is not voluntarily abandoned.
The Commission may, before making a decision that there is
an infringement, make recommendations to the relevant parties with a view toward bringing about a voluntary modification of the practices in question so that they no longer infringe
the Community rules."' If the parties make satisfactory
changes, the Commission may grant a negative clearance or an
exemption; otherwise, termination of the infringement will be
required.
From 1974 through 1977, the Court of Justice decided three
287
cases touching on procedural issues. In CommercialSolvents,
discussed above, the Court decided that the Commission may
order an undertaking to take positive remedial action. Procedural issues were also discussed in SABAM 28 8 and Sadolin &
Holmblad A/S (Members of the Transocean Marine Paint Association) v. EEC Commission.289
TransoceanMarine."' In this case, the Court examined the
exemption procedures and the imposition of conditions on exemptions. The Transocean Marine Paint Association is a group
of medium-sized companies which manufacturers marine
paint. Its purpose is to provide a worldwide sales network for
this type of paint. The organization allows its members to compete with the major international manufacturers which each
have their own international sales network.
The members manufacture marine paint of an identical
composition, use a common trademark, and maintain similar
284. Id. art. 2, 2411.
285. Id. art. 3(1), 2921.
286. Id. art. 2, 2411.
287. Commercial Solvents, supra note 202.
288. SABAM, supra note 203.
289. Sadolin & Holmblad A/S (Members of the Transocean Marine Paint Association v. EEC Comm'n, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8241 (Ct.
J. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Transocean Marine].
290. Id.
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quality control. Each member determines its own prices and
has its own sales territory. If a member makes a sale in another
member's territory, it must pay a commission to the latter.
Commissions are also payable "when a member sells, under its
own individual trademark, other paints in the territory of a
member and when a member passes on to another an order
which it is itself unable or unwilling to execute." 2 91
This agreement was exempted by a June 27, 1967 decision
of the Commission until December 31, 1972, pursuant to Article 85(3). The association was required by the decision to notify
the Commission of "any change in the composition of member2 92
ship."
On October 22, 1972, the association requested a ten year
renewal of the exemption. The Commission determined that an
exemption should be granted, subject to stricter conditions
than those of the 1967 exemption. Stricter conditions were necessary because of the following factors:
(a) the total turnover of the Association and its percentage of the market in marine paints had considerably increased;
(b) the turnover of one group of members, Nippon Paint,
had increased substantially and this group accounted for
60 percent of the turnover in marine paints of the Association;
(c) five members had withdrawn, eight new members
had joined;
(d) two members, Astral (France) and Urruzola (Spain),
had formed links with two large paint manufacturing
groups, AKZO and BASF, which are not members;
(e) a movement towards concentration had occurred
both in the marine paints sector and in the general paints
sector."'
Thus, on December 21, 1973, the Commission granted an exemption to the association subject to several new conditions
including the following:
Article 3
1. . . . the Commission shall be informed without delay
of the following matters:

291.
292.
293.

Id. at 9147-78.
Id.
Id.
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(d) any links by way of common directors or managers between a member of the Association and any
other company or firm in the paints sector or any
financial participation by a member of the Association in such outside companies or vice versa including
all changes in such links or participation already in
existence.2'
On March 4, 1974, the association initiated proceedings
before the Court of Justice to annul Article 3(1)(d) of the Commission's decision. It argued that because Article 3(1)(d) was
not mentioned in the July 27, 1973 "notice of objections," the
September 27, 1973 hearing, or in any communication from the
Commission prior to the decision, it had not had an opportunity to give its views on the obligation.
The association alleged that this denial of opportunity violated Regulation 99/63 which sets out the procedural rules for
hearings held pursuant to Regulation 17.291 In particular, the
association argued that the Commission failed to comply with
Article 2 of Regulation 99/63 which requires that "[tihe Commission . . . inform undertakings . . . in writing of the objec-

tions raised against them ' 2 6 and with Article 4 of that Regulation which permits the Commission to deal only with "those
objections . . . against undertakings . . . of which they have
' 2 97

views.
been afforded the opportunity of making known their
Finally, it contended that the Commission had infringed Article 85 and Article 8(1) of Regulation 17,295 by imposing an obligation wider in scope than permitted by those provisions.
The Commission, in response to the association's charge
that it had violated Regulation 99/63, asserted that such regulation was not applicable to conditions attached to a decision
granting an exemption.
The Court began its analysis of these competing proce17.291 It
dural claims by examining Article 19 of Regulation
Id. at 9147-78, -79.
Commission Regulation 99/63, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2635 (1963).
Id. art. 2, 2637 (1977).
Id. art. 4, 2639.
Council Regulation 17, art. 8(1) reads as follows:
(1) A decision to issue a declaration under Article 85, paragraph 3,
of the Treaty shall be valid for a specified period and may have certain
conditions and stipulations attached.
1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2471 (1971).
299. Council Regulation 17, art. 19 reads as follows:
1. Before taking decisions as provided for in Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8,
15 and 16, the Commission shall give the undertakings or associations of
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
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found that this provision requires the Commission, before issuing a decision pursuant to Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of
Regulation 17 to give the undertakings or associations concerned an opportunity to be heard on the matters to which it
has taken objection."' The reference to Article 6301 indicates
that this procedure must be followed before the issuance of
decisions granting or denying Article 85(3) exemptions.
Additionally, the Court noted that the Commission is
empowered by Article 24 to adopt rules of procedure implementing Article 19.302 The Commission exercised this power by
the issuance of Regulation 99/63.
The Court found that Regulation 99/63 was intended to
apply to all Article 19 hearings including those dealing with
Article 85(3).30 The Court reasoned that Regulation 99/63 flows
from the general principle that grants the right to be heard to
a person whose interests will be materially affected by the proundertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on the matters to
which the Commission has taken objection.
2. If the Commission or the competent authorities of the Member
States consider it necessary, they may also hear other natural or legal
persons. Applications to be heard on the part of such persons shall, where
they show a sufficient interest, be granted.
3. Where the Commission intends to give negative clearance pursuant to Article 2 or take a decision in application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty, it shall publish a summary of the relevant application or notification and invite all interested third parties to submit their observations
within a time limit which it shall fix, being not less than one month.
Publication shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings
in the protection of their business secrets.
Id. 1 2581 (1975).
300. Transocean Marine, supra note 289, at 9147-87.
Article 2 of Regulation 17 deals with "Negative clearance." Article 4 deals with
"Notification of new agreements, decisions and practices." Article 6 deals with "Decisions pursuant to Article 85(3)." Article 7 deals with "Special provisions for existing
agreements, decisions and practices." Article 8 deals with "Duration and revocation
of decisions under Article 85(3)." Article 15 deals with "Fines." Article 16 deals with
'Periodic penalty payments.' 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T$ 2401-2451 (1973).
301. Council Regulation 17, art. 6 reads as follows:
1. Whenever the Commission takes a decision pursuant to Article
85(3) of the Treaty, it shall specify therein the date from which the
decision shall take effect. Such date shall not be earlier than the date of
notification.
2. The second sentence of paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements, decisions or concerted practices falling within Article 4(2) and
Article 5(2), nor to those falling within Article 5(1) which have been
notified within the time limit specified in Article 5(1).
1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
2451 (1972).
302. Id. art. 24, 2631 (1973).
303. Transocean Marine, supra note 289, at 9147-87.
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posed decision of a public authority.34 According to the Court,
this conclusion followed "both from the nature and objectives
of the procedure for hearings, and from Articles 5, 6, and 7 of
Regulation 99/63.''305
However, the Commission cannot be expected to anticipate the exact conditions to which it will be necessary to subject an exemption. The result is that an undertaking must be
notified, in good time, of the gist of the conditions to which the
Commission plans to subject an exemption and must be given
an opportunity to present its views regarding these conditions
to the Commission.
With regard to the association's allegation that the obligation imposed by the Commission was broader than permitted
by Article 85 and Article 8(1) of Regulation 17, the Court held
that the Commission enjoys a "large measure of discretion" in
setting conditions to which an exemption may be subject.0 6 In
exercising this discretionary power, however, the Commission
must give the undertakings concerned an opportunity to voice
objections to the proposed conditions.
The Court concluded that these procedural requirements
were not met in the adoption of Article 3(1)(d) of the
Transocean Marine decision and, therefore, determined that
the Commission must reconsider the condition contained in
Article 3(1)(d) after hearing the views and suggestions of the
association .37
Thus, Article 8(1) of Regulation 1708 gives the Commission
authority to attach conditions and obligations to an exemption.
The Transocean Marine judgment confirms that the Commission has a wide "measure of discretion" in setting detailed
conditions and obligations to which an exemption may be subject.
Regulation 99/63 requires that undertakings be informed
in writing of the objections raised against them and that only
those objections about which the undertakings have been afforded the opportunity to make known their views be the subject of the Commission's decision. These rules, however, apply
primarily to decisions ordering the termination of an infringe304. Id.at 9147-88.
305. Council Regulation 17, art. 5, 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
art. 6, 2451; id.art. 7, 2461.
306. Transocean Marine, supra note 289, at 9147-88.
307. Id.at 9147-88, -89.
308. For the text of art. 8(1), see note 298 supra.

2441 (1973); id.
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ment, imposing a fine or denying negative clearance to an exemption.. The Court extended the rights of notice and having
an opportunity to be heard to cases where an exemption is
granted subject to conditions and obligations. The undertaking
concerned must be informed in good time of the essence of the
proposed conditions and must have an opportunity to make
comments.309
SABAM. Prior to the adoption of Regulation 17, the authorities of the member states were charged with ruling on the
admissibility of restrictive trade practices and abuses of dominant position in accordance with national law, Article 85, and
Article 86. In 1962, Regulation 17 was adopted pursuant to
Article 87,310 which requires, inter alia, the delineation of the
respective functions of the Commission and the national authorities. The areas of competence of these bodies are defined
in Article 9 of Regulation 17.311 Under this Article, the Commission is given the exclusive power to grant exemptions pursuant
to Article 85(3). The national authorities and the member
states retain concurrent jurisdiction to apply Articles 85(1) and
86 as long as the Commission has not initiated any proceeding
under Articles 2 (negative clearance), 3 (termination of infringement) or 6 (exemption) of Regulation 17.312
The language of Article 9 raises two fundamental questions: first, when has the Commission initiated proceedings?
and second, what is a national authority? The second question
was touched briefly by the European Court of Justice in Bilger
309.

The requirement adopted by the Court is analogous to the British rule of

natural justice, audi atteram partem. See S. DESMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ch. 4 (2d ed. 1968); H. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. V (3d ed. 1971).
310.
311.

Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 87, 298 U.N.T.S. 49.
Article 9 of Regulation 17 reads as follows:
1. Subject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice, the
Commission shall have sole power to declare Article 85(1) inapplicable

pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty.
2. The Commission shall have power to apply Article 85(1) and
Article 86 of the Treaty; this power may be exercised notwithstanding
that the time limits specified in Article 5(1) and in Article 7(2) relating
to notification have not expired.
3. As long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure under
Article 2, 3 or 6, the authorities of the Member States shall remain competent to apply Article 85(1) and Article 86 in accordance with Article
88 of the Treaty; they shall remain competent in this respect notwithstanding that the time limits specified in Article 5(1) and in Article 7(2)
relating to notification have not expired.
1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
2481 (1962).
312. See notes 268 & 301 and accompanying text supra.
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v. Jehle.31 3 In interpreting Article 82(2)'s rule of "automatic"
nullity, the Court noted, "the term 'authorities of the Member
'
States' also includes the national courts." ' This conclusion,
however, was not necessary to answer the questions put to the
Court.
Both questions were considered, without being fully an5
swered, in the famous de Haecht (No. 2) judgment." There,
the Court indicated that proceedings were not initiated when
the Commission acknowledged receipt of a request for negative
clearance."' However, it did not clearly define when proceedings should be considered to have commenced. In regard to the
definition of "national authority," the Court stated that it was
not necessary "to reexamine the question of whether the words
'authorities of the Member States' as used in Article 9 also refer
to the national courts acting on the basis of Article 85, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. . . .," " In SABAM, Advocate-General
Mayras interpreted this statement as a reaffirmation of the
indication in Bilger that national courts were national authorities." '
As noted earlier,3" 9 litigation between SABAM, BRT, and
NV Fonior began before a Brussels court in 1969, and an investigation of the activities of SABAM and several other copyright
associations was instituted by the Commission in June, 1970.
The Commission's inquiry and the Belgian investigation dealt
with almost the same facts. In April, 1973, the Brussels court
had requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice
on Articles 86 and 90.
The Commission argued that the Belgian court had been
deprived of jurisdiction because of the institution of Commission proceedings involving SABAM and that therefore, the
Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction to decide the case.
The Advocate-General in his submissions concurred with the
Commission.22
Thus, the Court of Justice had to decide the procedural
issue of jurisdiction before considering the merits. First, it ob313.
314.

(1967-1970 Court Decisions]
Id. at 8109.

COMM. MKT. REP.

(CCH)

8076 (Ct. J. 1970).

315. Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin, [1971-1973 Transfer.Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP.

(CCH) 8170 (Ct. J. 1973).
316. Id. at 8272.
317. Id.at 8271.
318. SABAM, supra note 203, at 9185-32.
319. See text accompanying notes 240-242 supra.
320. SABAM, supra note 203, at 9185-29.
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served that the competence of national courts to apply Community law in private actions derived from the direct effect of
the provisions of Community law itself.3 ' Articles 85(1) and 86
are part of national law and create direct rights for individuals
which national courts must safeguard. To prohibit the application of Treaty provisions by national courts would be to deprive
individuals of rights guaranteed by the Treaty.
The Court observed that the term, "authorities of member
states," in Article 9(3)322 of Regulation 17 refers exclusively to
those national agencies whose competence to apply Articles 85
and 86 derives from Article 88.33 Under Article 88:
the authorities of the Member-States-including the certain Member-States courts especially entrusted with the
task of applying domestic legislation on competition or
that of ensuring the legality of that application by the
administrative authorities-are also rendered competent
to apply the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty. 24
Even though courts which deal with governmental enforcement of competition rules are covered by the term, "authorities
of the member states," courts "before which the direct effect
of Article 86 is pleaded" 2 ' are not prohibited from giving judgment. Thus, the Court of Justice makes a distinction between
national courts with a special competence to deal with the
enforcement of competition rules by public authorities and
those which handle civil cases involving the interpretation or
application of Article 85 or 86. Courts of the former type are
national authorities; whereas, those of the latter type are not.
The Court of Justice discussed the circumstances under
which a court hearing a civil case might stay proceedings. If the
Commission has instituted a proceeding for the enforcement of
Article 85 or 86, a court hearing a civil case, if it considers it
necessary for consistency, may stay the proceedings until the
Commission has made a determination. If, however, the conduct in issue clearly cannot appreciably affect competition or
trade between member states, or if there is no doubt that such
conduct infringes the Treaty, the national court should gener321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 9185-22.
See note 311 supra.
Treaty of Rome, done March 25, 1957, art. 88, 298 U.N.T.S. 49-50.
SABAM, supra note 203, at 9185-23.
Id.
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ally hear a case.326 Finally, the Court found that Article 9(3) of
Regulation 17/62 cannot impede the power of a national court
to refer a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Jus-

tice .

3
11

As a result of the SABAM judgment, national courts can
maintain jurisdiction over cases in which the direct effect of
Article 85 or 86 is pled, even if the Commission begins proceedings. Furthermore, the suggestion in Bilger that courts are
national authorities, which cannot continue a trial after the
initiation of proceedings by the Commission, is overruled.
SABAM also prevents a situation in which a plaintiff is
unable to file a civil suit involving the application of Articles
85 or 86 for years because of time-consuming proceedings conducted by the Commission. On the other hand, after SABAM,
problems could arise if a national court declares a notified
agreement invalid pursuant to Article 85(2) and if the Commission then attempts to exempt the agreement pursuant to Article 85(3).
CONCLUSION

The cases discussed in the preceding pages demonstrate
that the Court of Justice plays a major role in the development
of antitrust law for the European Economic Community. The
exact function which the Court performs in a particular situation varies with the fact pattern. Often, the Court acts in a
traditional role by applying precedents and previously developed doctrines to the situations presented. Thus, in the
Centrafarm cases, the Court applied the well-developed enterprise-entity doctrine to the facts in issue. Even when the Court
functions by applying previously accepted precedents, the significance of its judgments varies depending upon whether the
precedent has been previously used by the Court or only by the
Commission.
In a slightly different vein, the Court will often apply a
principle from a previous judgment to a similar but not identical fact situation.2s The Court may also expand or clarify previously decided antitrust principles. Thus, in Van Viet, the
Court reaffirmed the principle that Regulation 67/67 does not
apply if the contracting parties prevent parallel imports into
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 9185-23.
Id.
Compare Dassonville, supra note 90, with Beguelin, supra note 101.
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the exclusive distributor's territory. It also expanded and clarified this doctrine by concluding that Regulation 67/67 is inapplicable if the parties prohibit parallel imports from the supplier's state, even if they allow such imports from other member states.
In a young legal system, like the Community, the judicial
authority is often faced with novel fact situations for which
there are no precise precedents. For example, in the
Commercial Solvents case the Court was faced for the first time
with a dominant firm's refusal to deal. In such a case, the Court
acts in several ways: it interprets the Treaty to see if the conduct in question is prohibited; it applies relevant general principles enunciated in pertinent previous cases; and, insofar as
the fact pattern it faces is new and different, it makes law.
Thus, in Commercial Solvents, the Court promulgated a new
legal rule prohibiting refusals to deal by dominant firms. This
holding is explicitly based on interpretation of the Treaty
and implicitly follows from the Court's decision in Continental
Can.
Of course, one of the Court's prime duties is to serve as an
arbiter in disputes between the legal system's enforcement authority, the Commission, and the entities subject to that authority's jurisdiction. When fulfilling this function, the Court
may sometimes apply precedent and sometimes develop new
law depending upon the facts in question. In Commercial Solvents, General Motors Continental, and Transocean Marine,
the Court acted as an arbiter. When performing this function,
the Court ensures that the Commission does not go beyond its
authority, misapply legal principles, or act without the appropriate procedural prerequisites. Thus, in General Motors
Continental the Court overruled an incorrect application of
Article 86; in TransoceanMarine it prevented the Commission
from acting without following the correct procedure; and in
Commercial Solvents it declared the Commission's order to be
within its authority.
An additional function of the Court involves its capacity
to issue preliminary rulings. In issuing preliminary rulings, this
function is primarily an interpretive one. Thus, in Sacchi, the
Court interpreted the phrase, "undertakings to which the
member states grant special or exclusive rights," in the light
of a certain fact pattern.
Finally, it is worth noting that several major themes
emerge from the cases examined in this article. Since these
cases are part of a historical progression, some of these themes
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are continuing, while others demonstrate a new emphasis.
Thus, the Court continues to strongly disapprove of agreements
or actions which result in market insulation and prevent parallel imports. For example, in Van Vilet an agreement which
prohibited parallel imports from the manufacturer's state was
condemned, and in Dassonville the Court suggested that the
invocation of national law by an exclusive distributor to ensure
absolute territorial protection would violate Article 85(1). Similarly, in Commercial Solvents the Court reemphasized that
Article 86 should be interpreted in light of the basic objectives
contained in Articles 2 and 3(f).
From the Court's pronouncement on relevant product
market in Kali, Commercial Solvents, and General Motors
Continental,it is evident that the operative concept in defining
of a product market is interchangeability. Additionally
SABAM and General Motors Continental indicate that the
Court is receptive to the idea that any member state qualifies
as a "substantial part of the common market" for purposes of
Article 86.
With respect to abuse of dominant position, the Court
continues to maintain that an undertaking in a dominant position cannot impose unreasonable obligations and restrictions
and that the measures employed to achieve its goals must be
the least restrictive possible29

Finally, in examining the procedural framework of the
Treaty, the Court established in Transocean Marine that undertakings affected by a Commission decision should receive
notice and an opportunity to be heard before the adoption of
such a decision. In addition, Commercial Solvents now provides that the Commission can require an infringing firm to
take affirmative remedial action.
These recurrent and emerging themes indicate that the
European Court of Justice is striving to safeguard the principles of free competition outlined in the Treaty of Rome. In so
doing, it has also 'maintained a flexible attitude towards all
types of competitive practices to further the European Economic Community's goals of stability and security.
329.

SABAM, supra note 203, at 9185-37.

